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Investor reaction to accounting misstatements under IFRS: Australian evidence 
Abstract 
We examine the investor reaction to misstatement news for Australian listed firms from 
2006 to 2013. We find 4.1% of firm-years have a misstatement and 79% of misstatements 
are disclosed initially only in the periodic filings (stealth misstatements). We find no 
investor reaction for the average misstatement, reactions of between -2.3% and -2.8% (-
1.5% and -1.7%) for misstatements that reduce prior-period earnings or equity (affect 
revenue), and reactions of between -1.3% and -2.7% for non-stealth misstatements. 
Investor reactions are more negative for non-stealth misstatements that reduce prior-
period earnings or equity than to stealth misstatements. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, research on the causes and economic consequences of misstatements of financial reports 
has assumed significant importance, evidenced by more than 150 studies undertaken in the U.S. (Karpoff 
et al., 2017). News of a misstatement signals that an issued financial report was unreliable. The economic 
consequences of misstatements are often costly for the firms and their investors, resulting in negative 
investor reactions at the announcement date and thereafter (Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Files et al., 
2014)2. While there are many U.S. studies, international research on misstatements is rare. In a review 
of academic research on misstatements, Sellars (2013) notes that most studies use U.S. data, and he calls 
for extending this research to an international context to understand the causes of and reactions to 
misstatements in other countries. A broader view is required because firms have become more global 
and regulators are working to harmonize accounting practices across the world (Sellars, 2013, p.13). In 
the meantime, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) expressed concern about 
the financial reporting quality of Australian firms. Beginning from July 1 2014, the ASIC reintroduced 
a policy that requires firms to make public announcements when they make material changes to 
information previously provided to the market to improve “…the level of market transparency” (ACCI 
media release 2016-205MR)3. In response to the 2015 audit inspection review, the ASIC found that 
auditors did not get reasonable assurance that the accounts were free of material misstatement in 19% 
of audit areas. We examine for the first time, the investor reaction to misstatement news for Australian 
listed firms, and in so doing, provide new information on the quality of Australian financial reporting.  
Shared institutional features in the common-law-based corporate-regulatory systems in Australia and 
the U.S. suggests that investor reactions to new accounting information could be similar for the two 
countries. However, other reasons suggest that the reactions might not be similar. First, unlike in the 
U.S. (where a firm must lodge a Form 8-K within four days of determining that prior accounts cannot 
be relied upon), there is no specific requirement in Australia to disclose the intention to restate accounts. 
                                                            
2 Anderson and Yohn (2002) identified other negative consequences including increased cost of capital, litigation, 
and regulatory enforcements, as well as auditor resignations, executive turnover, reduced investor confidence. 
3 This media release is available at: http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2016-
releases/16-205mr-asic-review-of-31-december-2015-financial-reports/ 
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Australian firms decide to announce separately misstatement news to the market considering the 
continuous disclosure provisions of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and the Corporations Act 
2001. Our data show that Australian firms are usually not forthcoming in this regard. Second, the 
Australian stock market has a much lower level of institutional ownership than the U.S. (Fereira and 
Matos, 2008) and it is comprised of smaller firms with fewer analysts following them. Third, the 
litigation risk in Australia is lower than in the U.S. (Morabito, 2010) and the probability of being sued 
accounts for approximately half of the investor reaction to misstatement announcements in the U.S. 
(Bardos et al., 2013). These types of reasons could have prompted Sellars (2013) to call for research 
using non-U.S. data. How investors react to Australian misstatement news is an important and 
unexplored empirical question.  
Recently, Karpoff et al. (2017) expressed concern about the extent of investor reactions reported in prior 
studies because commercially available databases fail to capture important news dates and events for 
some misstatement cases4. Karpoff et al. (2017) argue that U.S. studies using the AAER, GAO, Audit 
Analytics and SCAC databases underestimated the stock market’s reaction to misstatement news and 
they estimate that the mean one-day investor reaction using their hand-collected data is more than double 
the reaction using the dates from these databases.5 Our sample construction method, detailed in 
Appendix 1, seeks to capture unbiasedly the investor reactions to misstatement news, and provide the 
most accurate measure possible of the wealth effects of misstatements. 
From 2006 to 2013, we find a total of 704 firm-years with a misstatement, corresponding to 4.1% of all 
listed firm-years. The percentage of misstatements that change prior-period earnings or equity is about 
60, and the median of the percentage corrections to earnings (equity) is -4.9% (-1.3%). Due to outliers, 
means are also negative and much larger than the medians. More than 78% of misstatements are 
disclosed only in the periodic filings, that is, the half-year and annual reports. In the year a firm made 
                                                            
4 Karpoff et al. (2017) highlight four areas of concerns. First, the initial public revelations of financial misconduct 
occur months before the initial coverage in these databases. Second, these databases collect just one type of event, 
so they omit other relevant announcements that affect a researcher’s use of the events. Third, most of the events 
captured by these databases are unrelated to financial fraud. Fourth, the databases miss large numbers of events 
that they were designed to capture. 
5 Using only data from the databases results in underestimates of the mean investor reaction by between 56% and 
73% (Karpoff et al., 2017). The underestimates using median returns are larger for each of the databases. 
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an accounting error leading to the misstatement, it was younger, more likely to be audited by a non-Big 
4 audit firm or by a small audit office, to have an unclean audit opinion, to be in a technology industry 
and less likely to be in an extractive industry, compared to other firms. Univariate tests show stock price 
reactions of -1.5% (-2.3% and -2.5%) for misstatements that change (reduce) prior-period earnings or 
equity. We also document price reactions between -5.4% and -5.8% for misstatements attributable to 
fraud, and between -1.3% and -2.7% for non-stealth misstatements, consistent with U.S. studies (Files 
et al., 2009; Scholz, 2013; Adams et al., 2015). Multivariate tests show negative (positive) reactions for 
misstatements that reduce earnings or equity and those that affect revenue (stealth misstatements) with 
similar magnitudes to the results obtained from univariate tests. Negative reactions to misstatement 
corrections that reduce earnings or equity are larger for non-stealth disclosures than for stealth ones, 
consistent with U.S. studies (Files et al., 2009 and Myers et al., 2013). However, we find no such 
relations for revenue or core expense corrections.  Overall, investor reaction to Australian misstatement 
news is weaker than in the U.S. but stronger than in China, where a very weak reaction has been reported 
(Wang and Wu, 2011). Additional tests suggest that the disclosure of more serious misstatement 
corrections on the same date as the announcement of earnings could contribute to the weaker results. 
When significant, our results are broadly consistent with U.S. studies, suggesting that investors regard 
some Australian misstatement news as valuable.  
This paper makes three contributions to the misstatements literature. First, we show that in Australia, 
the investor reaction to misstatement news is weak and negative both for revenue corrections and for 
corrections that reduce earnings or equity. These results are consistent with a lower-litigation 
environment, less salient misstatement disclosure rules and lower institutional ownership than in the 
U.S. where reactions are generally stronger. They are also consistent with a stronger financial reporting 
regime than in China where reactions are weaker. We show that the negative investor reactions for 
corrections that reduce earnings or equity are larger for disclosures that are more salient. We also show 
that disclosure of large negative corrections to earnings and corrections to core expenses and revenues 
are more likely to be on an earnings announcement date, than other corrections. These findings suggest 
that if disclosure of misstatements is more salient the market could be better informed. Second, we 
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provide evidence that appears inconsistent with the proper functioning of the continuous disclosure rules 
because the proportion of salient disclosures of prior-period errors is only 21%, which seems low for 
such an important corporate event. Finally, we show that accounting misstatements are a good proxy for 
financial reporting quality in Australia because misstatement errors are associated with established 
measures of accounting quality proxies in the expected directions. By documenting misstatement 
incidence using a comprehensive and rigorous data collection method, we are informing the ASIC of 
the extent of this type of financial reporting quality in Australia. 
In the next section, we develop hypotheses for the relations between types of misstatement news and 
stock returns. Section 3 describes the sample data and descriptive statistics followed by coverage of the 
research methodology. Empirical results from univariate and multivariate tests are presented in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Australian GAAP for Misstatements, Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Australian GAAP for Misstatements 
Since the introduction of IFRS, a material, prior-period error should be recognized in the comparatives 
or the opening balances of assets, liabilities or equity for the prior period, if practicable.6 An accounting 
standard amendment from 2009 requires firms to disclose a balance sheet at the beginning of the earliest 
comparative period when it makes a prior-period adjustment (AASB 101, para 10f). In contrast, U.S. 
GAAP requires all prior periods to be restated. Due to the absence of the “if practicable” condition from 
U.S. GAAP, misstatement severity is measured more accurately using U.S. data because Australian 
firms can use the impracticality argument to avoid disclosure of the effects of the error(s) on prior years. 
Consistent with this contention, the mean number of years restated is 1.1 in our sample (see Table 2, 
Panel C), compared to 1.7 in the U.S. (see Scholz, 2013, Table 4, p.12). 
Under Australian GAAP, the nature of the error, the line items affected by the correction of the error, 
the amount of the correction at the start of the earliest period corrected and the change to earnings per 
share must be disclosed (AASB 108, para 49). As noted, Australia has no other specific disclosure 
                                                            
6 AASB 1004 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors paragraph 42 – 45. 
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requirement for misstatements. Instead, the requirement to disclose a misstatement can be caught by the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rule 3.1 (continuous disclosure rule): “Once an entity is or 
becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to have a 
material effect on the price or value of the entity’s securities, the entity must immediately tell ASX that 
information.”7 In contrast, in the U.S., Final Rule: Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and 
Acceleration of Filing Date requires a firm to lodge a Form 8-K within four days of determining that 
prior accounts cannot be relied upon.8  
2.2 Literature Review  
Almost all studies examining investor reactions to misstatement news use U.S. data (Sellars, 2013) and 
they find negative reactions.9 Anderson and Yohn (2002) report returns of -3.8% around misstatement 
news, and the most significant negative reaction is for misstatements attributable to fraud (-12.8%) 
followed by revenue-recognition issues (-7.9%). Owers et al. (2002) examine nine categories of 
misstatements and find that the most negative investor reactions are attributable to accounting issues 
such as errors and irregularities. Palmrose et al. (2004) report an investor reaction to misstatement 
announcements of -9% and that more negative abnormal returns are associated with more negative 
misstatements that involve fraud, that decrease earnings and for which the misstatement is not 
quantified. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) also report an announcement of cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) of -9% and conclude that misstatements reduce perceived earnings quality and increase the cost 
of capital. Agrawal and Chandha (2005) report returns of -4.2% for their full sample and find that core 
earnings corrections generate returns that are 4% more negative than non-core earnings corrections. 
Desai et al. (2006) report CARs of -11.1% and state that revenue corrections generate the largest 
negative reaction, followed by corrections for improper cost recognition.  
Recent U.S. studies report less negative CARs perhaps because there are fewer misstatements of revenue 
and core expenses in recent years (Scholz, 2013). Scholz (2013) reports that over the decade from 2003 
                                                            
7 Section 674 of the Corporations Act makes Listing Rule 3.1 legally binding for listed firms. 
8 Available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8400.htm. 
9 Studies using long return windows spanning several months also document market value declines associated with 
misstatements. See for example, Kinney and McDaniel (1989) and Wallace (2000) for U.S. evidence and Ahmed 
and Goodwin (2007) for Australian evidence.   
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to 2012, the average stock price reaction to misstatements in the U.S. is -1.5% (median of -0.01%), but 
she still finds more negative reactions to misstatements involving fraud, revenue and negative earnings 
corrections. For the period from 2002 to 2008, Files et al. (2014) find CARs of between -1.3% and -
1.6% for repeat misstatements. For the 12-year period prior to 2011, Adams et al. (2015) report CARs 
of -0.6% for U.S. real estate investment trusts of and -1.6% for non-REITs around misstatement 
announcements. To the best of our knowledge, Wang and Wu (2011) is the only non-U.S. study that 
examines investor reaction to misstatement news. They examine China, a country with similar 
accounting for misstatements to Australia. They find very weak evidence of a negative reaction and they 
attribute their results to the inefficiencies of the Chinese market mechanisms (e.g., low-litigation 
environment and low demand for high-quality auditors), misstatement behaviours of Chinese firms and 
lower reliance of Chinese investors on accounting data.  
Recent U.S. also studies examine the differential investor reaction to various types of salience of 
misstatement disclosure (Files et al. 2009; Myers et al. 2013; Scholz 2013).10 Theory differs as to 
whether disclosure salience should affect investor reactions. According to the efficient markets 
hypothesis (EMH), stock prices respond promptly and fully to all publicly available information (Fama, 
1970), and it should not matter if misstatement news is disclosed prominently in a press release or less 
prominently in the notes to the financial statements for example. The EMH ignores investors’ abilities 
to process information, and it assumes that the average investor is rational. The limited attention theory 
(LAT) argues that when humans devote attention to a particular task, the attention we can devote to 
other tasks is reduced because of limits in our ability to process information and perform multiple tasks 
simultaneously (Kahneman, 1973). LAT predicts that the average investor will not process a piece of 
information as efficiently when it is released at the same time as other information than when that piece 
of information is released at another time. Files et al. (2009) examine disclosure salience when managers 
exercise considerable discretion over how they announce an accounting misstatement in a press release. 
Some firms issue a press release that discloses the misstatement in the headline (high salience). Others 
                                                            
10 Misstatements not only negatively affect shareholder wealth of the restating firms but also adversely affect the 
wealth of non-restating firms within the same industry (Gleason et al., 2008). 
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provide a press release with a headline on a different subject but describe the misstatement in the body 
of the release (medium salience). The remaining firms discuss the misstatement at the end of the press 
release in a footnote to operating results (low salience). They find that three-day returns differ 
substantially across the three categories of disclosure salience, averaging -8.3%, -4.0%, and -1.5% for 
high, medium, and low salience, respectively. Files et al. (2009) use the LAT to explain their findings, 
arguing that managers in high-salience firms either seek to lower the firm’s cost of capital or are naïve 
to the stock price consequence of their disclosures. Myers et al. (2013) find a similar result to Files et 
al. (2009) by examining all misstatements disclosures rather than only press releases. Myers et al. (2013) 
report that 22% of U.S. firms in their sample disclose the misstatements only in the notes to the accounts 
and the announcement CARs of these firms are 1.6% higher (less negative) than those firms that 
highlight the misstatement via a press release. Scholz (2013) also finds that misstatements disclosed 
more saliently are associated with more negative investor reactions. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Investors revise their expectations of a U.S. firm’s present value of future net cash flows downward 
when it announces a misstatement. The changes in their beliefs presumably occur because misstatements 
increase uncertainty about the quality of a firm’s internal control system or its management (Hribar and 
Jenkins, 2004), signal lower future earnings levels or earnings quality (Anderson and Yohn, 2002; 
Palmrose and Scholz, 2004) or indicate that the firm faces a higher litigation risk in the future (Bardos 
et al., 2013). Australia is a market-oriented country with a legal system based in common law, strong 
institutions and a diverse shareholder base similar to the U.S. Thus, financial reporting quality should 
be higher than in countries such as China, where accounting quality is lower (Ball et al., 2003; Fan and 
Wong, 2002; Wang and Wu, 2011). Consequently, one expects timely releases of misstatement news by 
Australian firms and prompt processing of them by Australian market participants. In Australia, news 
of an error in audited financial reports should surprise market participants and investor reactions to that 
news should be closer to those in the U.S. rather than to those in China, where reactions are negligible 
(Wang and Wu, 2011).  
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However, differences in accounting disclosure rules, stock market composition and characteristics, 
levels of litigiousness and nature of the misstatement errors between Australia and the U.S. could 
attenuate investor reactions to Australian misstatement news. Approximately 79% of Australian firms 
(see Table 2, Panel B) disclose misstatement news only in their periodic filings. In contrast, this rate is 
22% in the U.S. in recent years (Myers et al., 2013). Prior studies report that the investor reaction to 
misstatement news disclosed only in periodic filings is weaker than when the news is disclosed 
separately. Furthermore, in Australia, to avoid the requirement to restate several prior years, firms can 
argue that it would be impracticable to restate prior-period accounts, an option not available to U.S. 
firms. This suggests that misstatement details such as trends in earnings are made clearer under U.S. 
GAAP. Table 2, Panel C shows that the mean number of corrected years is 1.1, whereas the analogous 
figure is 1.7 in the U.S. (Scholz, 2013), which is consistent with Australian firms relying on the 
impracticable “get-out” clause. This impracticability clause also applies to China (Wang and Wu, 2011). 
Lower-quality misstatement disclosures could increase uncertainty among investors, resulting in more 
mixed reactions among them. For these reasons, one expects a weaker investor reaction to misstatement 
news in Australia than in the U.S. 
There are important differences in stock markets’ abilities to impound information across developed 
economies. For instance, Griffin et al. (2011) find large differences in investors’ response to news 
announcements across developed countries, primarily caused by differences in insider trading and 
information dissemination in those countries. The extent to which stock prices impound information is 
positively related to the level of institutional ownership. This result is observed not only in the U.S. but 
also in Japan (Luo et al., 2014) and Australia (Gallagher et al., 2013). Since Australia’s stock market 
composition differs markedly from that of the U.S. with respect to levels of institutional ownership 
(Fereira and Matos, 2008) and average firm size, the average level of information dissemination (insider 
trading) could be lower (higher) in Australia. Furthermore, Australia has a much smaller market than 
the U.S. with fewer actors such as analysts participating in trading, and ‘hidden’ information may take 
longer for the market to discover. For these reasons, weaker reactions to misstatement news can be 
expected for Australia. Finally, despite an increase in shareholder class action lawsuits in Australia in 
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recent years (Legg, 2008), this increase has been modest and Australia remains a lower-litigation 
environment than the U.S. (Morabito, 2010; Murphy, 2013). Approximately half of the magnitude of 
the investor reaction to U.S. misstatements is explained by litigation risk (Bardos et al., 2013). Thus, 
weaker investor reactions than in the U.S. can be expected to the extent that the results of Bardos et al. 
(2013) also apply in Australia.  
With respect to the types of accounting issues associated with misstatements, Australia has a much 
higher proportion of note-disclosures than the U.S. Note-disclosures make up 21% of our sample (see 
FNOTEDIR in Table 2, Panel A) whereas Scholz (2013) reports about 3% for the U.S. over a similar 
period. Common among these notes are corrections in the directors’ remuneration note, which we do 
not expect to impact investors’ expectations of the firm’s earnings. Misclassifications in the cash-flow 
statement, income statement and balance sheet have little effect on future earnings, and these issues 
comprise approximately 26% of all misstatements (see CFMISS, ISMISSEPS, DEQMISS and 
ASSETMISS in Table 2, Panel A). There are about 21% of these types of misclassifications in the U.S. 
according to Scholz (2013). About 33% (17%) of Australian misstatements negatively (positively) affect 
prior-period earnings and the median change to those earnings is about -14% (14%) (untabulated). 
Scholz (2013) reports that about 53% (14%) of misstatements negatively (positively) affect prior-period 
U.S. firms’ earnings and the median change in earnings is about -15% (14%). The percentage of negative 
earnings corrections is much lower in Australia than in the U.S., suggesting a weaker investor reaction 
in Australia. Differences in the types of accounting issues also suggest a weaker investor reaction in 
Australia than in the U.S. We are unable to make a directional prediction for the average misstatement, 
so our first hypothesis is: 
H1: There is no relation between misstatement news and abnormal stock returns. 
Our next set of hypotheses concerns differential investor reactions to partitions of misstatement 
corrections. Since the average misstatement seems to cause downward revisions in the firm’s future 
earnings (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004), one expects some accounting issues associated with misstatements 
to be weaker signals for the firm’s future earnings. The market could view corrections to recognised 
numbers positively or negatively, depending on whether earnings or equity is increased or decreased. 
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Thus, our first partition is for misstatement corrections that change earnings or equity and other 
corrections and the hypothesis is in the null form: 
H2A: There is no difference between the CARs of misstatement corrections that change prior-
period earnings or equity and other misstatement corrections. 
One expects investors to regard downward earnings corrections more negatively than upward ones. We 
expect a differential reaction in Australia because accounting quality is high, unlike in China (Wang and 
Wu, 2011). However, as in China, Australian firms are not required to restate earnings before the start 
of the comparative year if that is impracticable. Following Wang and Wu (2011), to ensure that we 
capture all prior-period earnings corrections, we also examine equity corrections. Moreover, to ensure 
that the directional effect of the correction is unambiguous, in this analysis, we exclude cases where 
either earnings or equity takes the opposite sign. For example, we exclude a correction that reduces 
(increases) prior-period earnings and increases (reduces) prior-period equity from this analysis.  
H2B: Misstatement corrections that reduce prior-period earnings or equity have lower CARs than 
misstatement corrections that increase prior-period earnings or equity. 
Investors react more strongly to permanent income components than to one-time items (Elliott and 
Hanna, 1996). Prior U.S. research finds that negative earnings corrections and those affecting revenue 
and core earnings have lower CARs than other recognized misstatements (Anderson and Yohn, 2002; 
Palmrose et al., 2004; Scholz, 2008, 2013). Since corrections to revenue and core expenses can be 
upward or downward and since Australia has important differences in its litigation level, institutional 
ownership and size composition that could diminish the impact of misstatements, our next hypothesis is 
in the null form: 
H2C: There is no difference between the CARs for misstatement corrections that change revenue 
or core expenses and other misstatement corrections. 
Our final hypothesis concerns the level of salience of misstatement disclosure. The theory of investors’ 
limited attention (Hirschleifer and Teoh, 2003) predicts a positive relation between the disclosure 
saliency of misstatement disclosures and the absolute magnitude of the investor reaction to their 
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announcements. As noted, most Australian misstatements are only disclosed in the firms’ periodic 
filings. Files et al. (2009) and Scholz (2013) find that non-stealth misstatements have more negative 
CARs than stealth misstatements in the U.S. Conversely, if markets are efficient, there should be no 
difference in the investor reaction for stealth and non-stealth disclosures. Since we have no directional 
expectation, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: There is no difference in investor reaction to stealth misstatements versus non-stealth 
misstatements. 
3. Empirical Tests 
3.1 Sample selection 
A misstatement is defined as a “difference between the amount, classification, presentation, or 
disclosure of a reported financial report item and the amount, classification, presentation, or disclosure 
that is required for the item to be in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework.  
Misstatements can arise from error or fraud.” (ASA200, para 13.4(i)). In the interest of consistency with 
Australian auditing standards, we use this definition to identify a misstatement for inclusion in our 
dataset. Prior U.S. studies report negative investor reactions to misstatement news (Palmrose et al., 2004; 
Adams et al., 2015) and differential investor reactions to misstatement characteristics, such as whether 
a correction affects core or non-core earnings (Palmrose et al., 2004; Scholz, 2013). Due to the absence 
of an Australian classification of misstatement data and for comparability, we follow key U.S. studies 
for our classification scheme of misstatement issues in our tests. 
We hand-collect our data from all publicly available potential sources of misstatements, namely, the 
websites of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC), and the Australian Financial Review. Additionally, we complement our data 
collection using a Factiva search. Appendix 1 shows the details of the sample-collection method. Our 
final sample comprises 704 firm-years (540 different firms) for the period 2006-2013, within which 415 
firms had one misstatement, 97 had two, 18 had three, 9 had four and 1 had five (untabulated).11 Our 
                                                            
11 In our sample, the percentage of firms that are repeat misstaters is 23, which is lower than the 38% reported in 
Files et al. (2009) for their sample of U.S. firms for the 7-year period prior to 2008. 
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sample percentage, which is 4.1% of all listed firm-years, is quite close to the 4% reported by ASIC for 
the period from 2010 to 2015 (16-205MR ASIC review of 31 December 2015 financial reports). 
Table 1 about here 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that the number of misstatements increased 
monotonically from 63 in 2006 to 122 in 2009 and then decreased monotonically thereafter to 65 in 
2013. Increases in the number of listed firms do not explain this trend because the percentages of listed 
firms with misstatements also increased monotonically from 3.8 in 2006 to 6.3 in 2009. Although it is 
outside the scope of this paper to explain these trends, the 2007 uptick could be due to the identification 
of GAAP differences by scrutinizing prior-period accounting practices around the initial use of IFRS. 
The continued upticks through 2009 could be due to the impending introduction of the amendments to 
the accounting standard, AASB101. More specifically, for fiscal years beginning 1 January 2009, the 
new AASB101 requires a third balance sheet for the earliest restated period to be prepared, seemingly 
causing some firms to re-evaluate their accounting policies. To avoid this costly requirement, a firm can 
restate on June 30, 2009. Changes in the state of the economy may also explain the trends, especially 
for the years leading to the global financial crisis.12 There are 607 (546) error years from 2006 to 2013 
(2006 to 2011) or 4.1% (4.9%) of firm fiscal years. The Error Years variable’s statistics are understated 
the most for the 2013 year, because that is the most recent year for which we collected data and the 
mean reporting lag is 1.2 years (see Table 2, Panel C).13 We show the earliest error year in the two 
columns at the far right of Panel A of Table 1, that is, only one error year for each misstatement year. In 
our examination of misstating firms’ characteristics set forth below, we use the earliest error year to 
identify the firms because 70 of the sample firms have more than one error year for a misstatement year. 
In that examination, we use only the data through 2011 to ensure that the majority of errors are within 
the period used for our analyses, following prior studies (Francis et al. 2013). Panel B of Table 1 shows 
                                                            
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. Xu et al. (2011) find similar upward trends in going 
concern reporting. 
13 We do not tabulate error years before 2006 because Australian GAAP was different then and we have not 
gathered data for all prior error years indicating that the error year numbers will be understated. The error year 
frequencies prior to 2006 are in parentheses: 2005 (65), 2004 (25), 2003 (3), 2002 (4), 2001 (3) and 1998 (1).  
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the percentage of misstating firms by industry.14 The percentages are generally in line with the overall 
industry percentages, except for the Basic Resources industry, which is under-represented in our sample 
compared to its weight in the Australian market, and the Industrial Goods & Services, Retail, 
Technology industries, which are overrepresented in our sample compared to their weights in the 
Australian market.  
Table 2 Panel A shows frequencies of the accounting issues underlying misstatements. In the absence 
of an Australian classification scheme, we use Scholz’s (2013) scheme for U.S. firms, modified for 
Australian GAAP. The accounting issues’ variable names and definitions appear in Appendix 2. We 
include corrections for misstatements of upward noncurrent asset revaluations (17 observations) in the 
INVESTING category. U.S. GAAP does not allow these revaluations. As in Scholz (2013), the 
percentages of misstatements do not total 100 because a misstatement case can have more than one 
accounting issue. The most common accounting issue involves corrections to footnotes (including 
segment notes) or Directors’ Reports (denoted FNOTEDIR), at 20.6% of total misstatements. In contrast, 
Scholz (2013) reports a percentage of 3% for footnote-disclosure issues. Much of this difference in 
percentages is likely attributable to our inclusion of corrections to the Directors’ Report (which became 
more common after 2008) within our dataset. The second most-common issue is tax-related corrections 
(TAX) at 15.3%, followed by revenue-recognition corrections (REV) at 13.1%.  
Table 2, Panel B shows that the initial disclosure of the error occurs within the half-year and financial-
year report filings for 625 (89%) misstatement years, but only 70 of them are accompanied by a separate 
announcement highlighting the misstatement, such as a press release or an ASX announcement. Thus, 
for 555 of our misstatement years, or 79% of our sample, misstatement errors are disclosed initially 
within the periodic filings. We use the term ‘stealth misstatement’ to describe such errors. Untabulated 
statistics show that there are 356 (85%) corrections that change earnings or equity that are stealth 
misstatements, whereas there are 199 (70%) corrections that do not change earnings or equity that are 
stealth misstatements. The difference is statistically significant, with a Chi-square statistic equal to 23.8 
                                                            
14 We use Datastream industry classifications. 
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(p<0.01). Since corrections that change recognized information are regarded as more severe than 
corrections that do not change recognized information (Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Palmrose et al., 
2004), this evidence is consistent with less disclosure saliency for more severe misstatements, and 
supports the ASIC’s recent concerns about financial reporting quality.  
Table 2 about here 
Panel C of Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the misstatement variables. MISSTATEMENTLAG is 
the number of years from the misstatement year to the earliest year of an error. We find that the earliest 
error year is 1.2 years before the misstatement year, on average. The maximum statistic shows that the 
earliest error year is at most seven years before a firm’s misstatement year. Similar to Hirschey et al. 
(2015), we measure disclosure timeliness (Error lag) by the number of days from the lodging of the most 
recent incorrect audited financial report to the earliest date of disclosing the error. Error Lag is equal to 
one day when an ASX announcement about the error occurs on the same day as the lodgement of the 
incorrect financial report. The table shows that the mean (median) of the error lag is approximately 228 
(239) days and the 20th percentile is 120 days (untabulated), indicating that misstatement disclosures are 
not timely for most firms. In contrast, Hirschey et al. (2015) report a mean (median) of 175 (139) days 
for a sample of U.S. firms. As noted, the U.S. requires disclosure within four days of the error 
identification, which could explain these differences in disclosure timeliness. The large maximum error 
lag of 1,789 days is a case where a financially distressed firm restated its accounts after a long period 
without lodging any accounts. Most firms restate only one year, indicated by the mean (median) of 1.1 
(1) for the Number years restated variable. The mean of 1.6 for the Number accounting issues variable 
is lower than the mean of 2.2 reported in Scholz (2013), probably due to the larger proportion of 
disclosure-only misstatements in our sample, namely, the FNOTEDIR variable as shown in Panel A. 
The mean of 0.6 for Earnings or Equity change variable indicates that the percentage of misstatements 
that increase or decrease earnings or equity is 60 (N=418, untabulated)15. Some corrections change only 
earnings or only equity. This occurs most commonly because of errors that affect only earnings earlier 
than the prior year and the firms not disclosing the effect on earnings for those periods but instead 
                                                            
15 References to earnings or equity are to consolidated net income or consolidated equity in this paper. 
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disclosing the effect on equity. There are also share-based payment accounting errors, whose correction 
changes earnings but not equity. The mean (median) percentage change to earnings is - 39.2% (-4.9%) 
and for equity, it is -8.3% (-1.3%). These values indicate the presence of some very large percentage 
decreases for earnıngs and equity. The maximum percentage decrease for earnings of 4,719.8 occurred 
for the correction of an asset-impairment error for a disposal group held for resale, changing a firm’s 
loss from $5.77 million to $278.33 million. The maximum percentage decrease for equity of 469.3 
occurred for the correction of a consolidation error, changing a sample firm’s equity from $0.71 million 
to -$2.62 million.16 Other untabulated data show that 83% of firms do not disclose the initiator of the 
misstatement and of the remainder, 11% of misstatements are by management, 4% are by the ASIC and 
2% are by auditors. The number of misstatement years associated with fraud is 21 (2%). We exclude a 
variable measuring the initiator of the misstatement from our models because of significant data error 
in its measurement. To avoid a look-ahead bias in our analyses, we code a disclosure as “fraud” when 
the words “fraud” or “irregularity” appear in the disclosure.  
Table 3 about here 
Prior to undertaking investor reaction tests, it is important to examine the suitability of Australian 
misstatement data as a financial reporting quality proxy for two reasons. First, one expects the investor 
reaction to be weak if misstatements are a poor indicator of financial reporting quality (Wang and Wu, 
2011). Second, differences in misstating firms’ characteristics between Australia and other countries 
could explain differences in investor reactions between them. Firm size is a risk proxy (Fama and 
French, 1993), and there is an inverse relation between firm size and the strength (Freeman, 1987) and 
variability (Atiase, 1985) of the market’s reaction to news. We perform univariate comparisons of means 
and distributions and estimate logit models explaining misstatement events based on prior research. We 
use the earliest year of the error to identify misstatement firms, and we eliminate misstating firms’ data 
from any other of their error years and from the sample of control firms for valid comparisons. 
Otherwise, we use all ASX-listed firms in our control sample. The mean of the misstatement lag is 1.2 
years (see Table 2, Panel C), thus, in these analyses, we use 2011 as our final year to allow enough time 
                                                            
16 The companies are Australasian Resources Limited and Ausmani Limited, respectively. 
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after the initial error year for most errors to be disclosed in our sample period. Panel A of Table 3 shows 
means and medians of misstatement and control firm-years for various firm characteristics. Variable 
definitions appear in Appendix 3. In addition, the statistics in Table 1 suggest dummy variables for the 
IFRS year and the year thereafter, namely, 2006 and 2007,17 and for Basic Resources (MINE) and 
Technology and Telecommunications (TECH) industries.  
Univariate test results are shown in Panel A of Table 3. Firm size (SIZE) and profitability (ROA, LOSS) 
variables show that firms that subsequently have a misstatement are larger and more profitable in their 
earliest error year. They also have higher leverage, pay higher audit fees and are clients of smaller audit 
offices. Moreover, they are more likely to be in a technology industry and have misstated in 2006 or 
2007 (IFRS). Furthermore, they are less likely to be audited by a Big 4 audit firm or be in the extractive 
industries (MINE). To examine the relationships between firm characteristics and the incidence of errors 
subsequently corrected more formally, we estimate the following logistic regression: 
 ERRORYEAR = α+γXF+δXO+κj+λt+ε (1) 
where ERRORYEAR equals unity if the firm had an error that fiscal year which was subsequently 
corrected and zero otherwise. XF are the firm-specific attribute variables and XO are other attribute 
variables that may affect ERRORYEAR. Appendix 3 provides these variables’ definitions, the signs of 
their expected coefficients and references to supporting literature. We estimate model (1) with and 
without firm-fixed effects to control for firm-specific variables that are stable over time such as 
governance mechanisms. The model without firm fixed effects is denoted by Model 1A and the model 
with firm fixed effects is denoted by Model 1B. The industry group and year group indicator variables, 
denoted by κj and λt, respectively, are included to control for industry and time effects on estimated 
ERRORYEAR. Throughout this paper, regression standard errors are clustered by firm and year 
following Gow et al. (2010), and two-tailed p-values are presented. Regression results are shown in 
Panel B of Table 3. We find consistent evidence across both models that misstatement firms are less 
likely to be audited by a Big 4 audit firm and more likely to receive an unclean audit opinion, to be 
                                                            
17 The first fiscal year of IFRS was 2005 only for firms with a 31 December fiscal year end, which is approximately 
10% of listed firms. 
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younger and to be audited by a smaller audit office, consistent with prior studies. We also find that 
misstatement firms are more likely to be in the Telecommunications or Technology (TECH) industry. 
These results suggest that misstatement data are a good indicator of financial reporting quality in 
Australia because clients of Big 4 audit firms and large audit offices have higher financial reporting 
quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014, Francis and Yu 2009). Moreover, younger firms and those with 
unclean audit opinions are more likely to have weaker internal control systems (Doyle et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, firms in technology industries have more complex accounting (Francis and Gunn, 2015). 
We also find that LEV, LAF, NEW and IFRS load positively in the cross-sectional model. We do find 
some inconsistent evidence: the SIZE coefficient is positive and significant, but only in the fixed-effects 
model, and the ROA coefficient is positive and significant, but only in the cross-sectional model. Since 
Australian GAAP permits firms to avoid disclosing the effects of errors on reporting periods earlier than 
the prior period for reasons of “impracticability”, measurement error in the earliest year variable is an 
unavoidable problem. To reduce this error, we examine the notes about the misstatements and remove 
the cases in which the firms disclose that it is impracticable to restate earlier years. We are certain of the 
error year for 437 cases. Untabulated results give the same inferences.18 One concludes that Australian 
misstatement data are a solid indicator of financial reporting quality for that country.  
3.2 Measurement of variables 
We employ a one-factor event study model to estimate firms’ abnormal returns around misstatement 
announcements. First, for each firm, we estimate market model parameters by running an ordinary least 
squares regression in the estimation period. 
𝑅௜,௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௜𝑅௠,௧ + 𝜀௜,௧            (2) 
where 𝑅௜,௧ is the return to firm i at day t, 𝑅௠,௧ is the return to the market portfolio at day t, and 𝜀௜,௧ is the 
zero-mean constant variance error term. We set the estimation period as (-126, -6) trading days relative 
                                                            
18 In other untabulated tests, we estimated model 1A including 12-month abnormal stock returns as an additional 
explanatory variable following Francis et al. (2013) and found its coefficient to be insignificant (coeff.=0.04, 
p=0.57), inconsistent with Francis et al. (2013). We also included the square of SIZE in the model, and its 
coefficient was insignificant. Inferences about other coefficients are the same as in Table 3. 
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to the first announcement of the misstatement event (day 0)19. As discussed above, a misstatement event 
could be revealed to the market at different times through multiple channels. Therefore, by using the 
earliest of all such dates (if any) as our event date, we ensure that the market model parameters are 
estimated without any bias. We do not estimate market model parameters if the total number of 
observations in the estimation period is less than 50. 
The abnormal returns in the event period are calculated and accumulated as 
𝐴𝑅௜,௧ = 𝑅௜,௧ − (𝛼పෝ + 𝛽ప෡ 𝑅௠,௧)           (3) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅௜௞ = ∑ 𝐴𝑅௜,௧௞௧ୀି௞             (4) 
where 2k+1 is the event window size, 𝐴𝑅௜,௧ is the abnormal returns to firm i on day t and 𝐶𝐴𝑅௜௞ is the 
cumulative abnormal returns to firm i in the event window.  
As we explain in more detail in Appendix 1, we use two different methods to estimate the CARs. Under 
the first method, the event date is defined as the earliest date of publicly released information about the 
misstatement. As Table 2, Panel B shows, this date is the lodging date of company financials in most 
cases. Under the second method, we follow Karpoff et al. (2017) and examine the cumulative stock 
investor reaction to all relevant announcements about the misstatement event. To capture the wealth 
effects of these multiple announcements, we sum the firm’s abnormal returns around all these event 
dates (if any). The CAR estimates under the second method aim to capture the cumulative reaction to 
the entire information flow regarding the misstatement event. For both methods, we choose k=1 and 
accumulate abnormal returns over (-1, +1).  
To assess the robustness of our results to the choice of the econometric model, we also estimate a simple 
market-adjusted model in which daily abnormal returns are calculated as daily stock returns minus daily 
market returns. The abnormal returns are then accumulated over the same event windows as in the one-
factor market model. To estimate the daily market returns, we use Datastream’s value-weighted market 
index returns that reflect redistribution events. Finally, the existence of small or large outliers could 
                                                            
19 We find similar results if we set the estimation period as (-252, -6) trading days relative to the first announcement 
of the misstatement event. 
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affect results significantly, especially in small samples. To address this possibility, we winsorize all 
CAR variables at their 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.  
We expect the announcement CARs to be lower for misstatement corrections that reduce prior-period 
earnings or equity than for those that do not. We therefore include an indicator variable, NEGEARNEQ, 
which equals unity if the net effect of the correction on prior-period earnings or equity is negative and 
zero otherwise. A negative relation between CARs and a negative earnings impact indicator is usually 
reported by U.S. studies (Files et al. 2009, Myers et al. 2013). We include variables that control for the 
severity of the misstatement, namely, CONSOL_EQ_TA measured as the net effect of the misstatement 
on shareholders’ equity scaled by the total assets of the firm at the end of the year prior to the 
misstatement year; REV, which is an indicator equal to unity if recognized revenue is corrected and zero 
otherwise; COREEXPENSES, which is an indicator equal to unity if operating expenses are corrected 
and zero otherwise; NUMERRORS, which is the number of errors associated with a misstatement; and 
FRAUD, which is an indicator equal to unity if the words “fraud” or “irregularity” appear in the 
disclosure and zero otherwise. Prior U.S. research generally finds negative coefficients for these 
variables. Stealth and non-stealth misstatements may affect abnormal returns differently around 
announcement dates. Therefore, we include an indicator, STEALTH, equal to unity for misstatements 
initially disclosed only in the periodic filing and zero otherwise.  
We include SIZE (the natural logarithm of total assets), because investor reactions to announcements by 
large firms may be weaker than the reactions by small firms due to differences in their information 
environments (Freeman, 1987).  We include LEV (total liabilities divided by total assets) to control for 
the firm’s financial risk and ROA (earnings divided by total assets) to control for the firm’s profitability. 
EARNINGS_SURPRISE measures the information content associated with earnings for misstatements 
that are released simultaneously with earnings announcements and is equal to the difference in net profits 
between the most recent and prior financial statements scaled by the total assets at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. Some earnings and misstatements’ announcements are not released simultaneously, thus, 
EARNINGS_SURPRISE measured at the most recent and prior financial statements should not be an 
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important explanatory variable for them.20 In untabulated tests, we estimate the models without 
EARNINGS_SURPRISE with no change in inferences for the test variables.21 Finally, abnormal returns 
are likely to behave differently during recessionary periods, so we include indicator variables for 
misstatements in 2008 and 2009. All variables, except for indicator and log-transformed variables, are 
winsorized at their 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. 
To examine the relationship between misstatement characteristics22 and CARs, we estimate the 
following OLS “cross-sectional” model (firm and year subscripts are omitted): 
                                                                      𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋ோ + 𝛾𝑋஼ + 𝛿௧ + 𝜀                                    (5) 
where 𝑋ோare the misstatement characteristics, 𝑋஼  are the firm-level control variables mentioned above, 
and indicator variables denoted by 𝛿௧  are included to control for industry and year fixed effects.  
4. Results 
4.1 Univariate tests 
Table 4 presents results from one-sample mean t-tests for CARs calculated using various methods 
around misstatement announcements for the full sample and for partitions of misstatement 
characteristics. We conduct these univariate tests for the same sample of 594 misstatements used for our 
multivariate tests for comparability. 
Table 4 about here 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the average three-day investor reaction to the full sample of misstatements 
varies between -0.9% and -0.1% depending on the method used to calculate CARs, and none of these 
means differ significantly from zero. Hypothesis 1 is not rejected. In Panel B of Table 4, we partition 
the sample based on each misstatement correction’s effect on earnings or equity. We find that for 
misstatements that change earnings or equity, the mean abnormal returns differ insignificantly from zero 
                                                            
20 We thank the reviewer for pointing out this issue. 
21 In other untabulated tests, we also add market-to-book ratio of equity to our specifications and obtain similar 
results, albeit for a smaller sample. 
22 Appendix 4 shows definitions of those misstatement characteristics used as control variables not explained in 
Appendices 2 and 3. 
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for CARs calculated only on the initial announcement date of the misstatements (Method 1). However, 
for Method 2 where we sum CARs across all event dates, the mean CAR is -1.5% for both the market 
beta adjustment and for the simple market adjustment, and both means are significant. For misstatement 
corrections that do not affect earnings or equity, none of the mean CARs is significantly different from 
zero. For the market-adjusted CAR means under Method 2, we find that corrections changing earnings 
or equity differ significantly from corrections that do not, as the two columns on the far-right show 
(mean diff. = -0.019, p = 0.094). Hypothesis 2A is rejected. These findings highlight the importance of 
accumulating abnormal returns over multiple event dates, as Karpoff et al. (2017) suggest. Mean CARs 
for misstatements that reduce earnings or equity (NEGEARNEQ) are negative for all calculation methods 
and significant for Method 2, with abnormal returns of -2.3% (p = 0.032) and -2.5% (p = 0.024) for the 
beta adjustment and market adjustment models, respectively. Mean CARs for POSEARNEQ are 
insignificant, indicating that investors react to misstatements with unfavourable information content 
more strongly, consistent with U.S. studies. Both the beta-adjusted and market-adjusted mean CARs for 
Method 1 are significantly lower for NEGEARNEQ than for POSEARNEQ. Hypothesis 2B is not 
rejected using a one-tailed test. 
Panel C of Table 4 shows mean CARs for the subsample of accounting issues shown in Panel A of Table 
2. No issue has an investor reaction significantly different from zero except for REORG, which has 
positive mean CARs of 3.3% and 3.9% under Method 2 for the beta adjustment and market adjustment 
models, respectively. Since accounting for reorganizations is complex and can affect many parts of the 
firm’s financial statements, investors may perceive that misstatement corrections in accounting for 
reorganizations is accompanied by more internal control improvements than for other misstatement 
corrections. One can observe a positive reaction if these improvements have benefits beyond the costs 
of the misstatement error. The lack of significant CARs for the other accounting issues could be due to 
the heterogeneous information within each issue reducing the power of the tests. For example, although 
one expects REV corrections to attract investor attention, mean CARs are insignificant for all measures. 
However, if we examine those 46 REV corrections that also reduce either earnings or equity, we find 
negative and significant mean CARs, with one as low as -5.16% (untabulated). These results suggest 
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that whether a misstatement correction reduces earnings or equity is most important for Australian 
investors. Panel D of Table 4 shows two severity measures of misstatements often examined in U.S. 
studies, namely, whether the misstatement relates to fraud, and the number of errors associated with the 
misstatement. For misstatements related to fraud, the three-day average abnormal returns range from -
5.4% to -8.7% and despite the small number observations, two of the CAR metrics are statistically 
significant, consistent with U.S. studies. We do not find significant abnormal returns for misstatements 
with multiple errors. Panel E of Table 4 shows mean CARs partitioned by whether the misstatement is 
disclosed only in the periodic filings (stealth misstatements), or otherwise (non-stealth misstatements). 
Consistent with the LAT, investors react more negatively to non-stealth misstatements than to stealth 
ones. For the 117 non-stealth misstatements in our sample, the average CARs vary between -1.3% and 
-2.7% and all differ significantly from zero. In contrast, none of the means for stealth CARs is 
significant. The bottom row of Panel E shows that three of the four pairs of mean CARs differ 
significantly from one another. We reject Hypothesis 3. The multivariate regression tests covered in the 
next section, provide more robust evidence on the investor reaction to misstatement news. 
4.2 Multivariate tests 
Before discussing the results of the multivariate regression tests, we present descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the models. As noted, we use four CAR measures to assess the reaction around 
misstatement news dates, and the first four rows of Table 5 shows statistics for these variables. The 
standard deviations of the CARs estimated using Method 2 are higher than those estimated using Method 
1. Thus, accumulating abnormal returns over multiple event dates results in more volatile CAR 
estimates. The mean CARs for both methods are close to zero although Method 2 yields slightly more 
negative CARs than Method 1 does. We do not find meaningful differences between the market model 
and simple market-adjusted model estimates, and the distribution of beta- and simple market-adjusted 
CARs seem to be comparable to each other under their respective methods.  
Table 5 about here 
The other rows of Table 5 show the statistics for the independent variables. The misstatement 
announcements in our regression sample contain information about a variety of error types made in 
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earlier financial reports, such as those having a negative impact on the prior period’s earnings or equity 
(38.9% of the sample), those having an error for revenue recognition (13.3%), for core expenses (27.8%) 
and those associated with corporate fraud (2%). The percentage of stealth misstatements is 80.3%, 
meaning that fewer than 20% of the misstatement years were highlighted to the market, by, for example, 
a separate announcement, an ASX headline, or a re-issue of the financial report.  
Table 6 shows the results from estimating model (5). The coefficients of the NEGEARNEQ dummy 
shown in the first row of the table indicate that the three-day abnormal returns associated with 
misstatements that reduce earnings or equity vary between -1.1% and -2.8%. These coefficients are 
statistically significant when abnormal returns are cumulated over multiple event dates (Method 2), 
implying that unfavourable misstatements are penalized by the market around dates other than the initial 
revelation date. These results are consistent with the univariate results in Table 4. The magnitude of the 
misstatement correction, namely CONSOL_EQ_TA, has positive coefficients across all specifications, 
but no coefficient is significant. REV has a negative coefficient in all specifications that ranges from -
0.005 to -0.017 and the coefficients estimated using Method 1 are significantly different from zero and 
consistent with expectations. This result leads us to reject Hypothesis 2C. The coefficient estimate for 
COREEXPENSES is insignificant, inconsistent with U.S. studies.  
Table 6 about here 
Although the coefficient estimates for FRAUD are high and a misstatement that is associated with fraud 
has an average incremental abnormal return of between -3.3% and -4.7%, none of these coefficients are 
significant, potentially due to the lack of statistical power driven by the small number of observations 
for FRAUD. However, the coefficient estimates for the STEALTH dummy are reliably positive in all 
specifications. They range from 0.013 to 0.025 and indicate that misstatement firms that do not draw 
attention to their errors experience CARs between 1.3% and 2.5% higher than misstatement firms that 
highlight their errors. Managers who highlight the error may believe that their firms’ cost of capital will 
be lower as a result or are naïve to the consequences (Files et al. 2009). The number of errors in a 
misstatement has no relation with abnormal returns. Regarding the control variables, ROA loads 
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positively under Method 2 for the simple market adjustment and EARNINGS_SURPRISE loads 
positively under Method 1. 
The insignificance of the misstatement characteristics’ coefficients could be due to the assumption in 
model (5) that the characteristics’ effects are the same across all observations. Prior research has shown 
that misstatements disclosed ‘stealthily’ are associated with less pronounced negative investor reactions 
on announcement dates (Files et al., 2009; Myers et al., 2013). We examine whether the level of ‘stealth’ 
of misstatement disclosures moderates the relation between CARs and misstatement characteristics by 
interacting the STEALTH dummy with misstatement characteristics.  
Table 7 about here 
Table 7 shows the results of estimating Model 5 including the STEALTH indicator and its interaction 
with misstatement characteristics. This new model is denoted Model (6). NEGEARNEQ has a 
significantly negative coefficient in all specifications with values between -0.028 and -0.064, indicating 
that when misstatements that reduce earnings or equity are disclosed more saliently (non-stealth ones), 
abnormal returns of between -2.8% and -6.4% are observed for them. On the other hand, the coefficients 
on the interactions of NEGEARNEQ with the stealth dummy, denoted by NEGEARNEQ_INT, have 
positive coefficients that are significant when measured by accumulating across all relevant 
misstatement events. For these models, misstatements that reduce earnings or equity and are not 
disclosed saliently (stealth misstatements) have abnormal returns of -2.1% (-0.064 +0.043 or -
0.063 +0.041), or approximately 4 percentage points less negative than non-stealth misstatements. In 
other words, investors penalize highlighted bad news more than bad news disclosed stealthily, a result 
that is consistent with the LAT and U.S. research (Files et al. 2009, Myers et al. 2013). We reject 
Hypothesis 3. CONSOL_EQ_TA and its interaction with the stealth dummy (CONSOL_EQ_TA_INT) 
have insignificant coefficients and REV also loses its significant coefficient in Table 6 when the 
interaction term is introduced. It seems that disclosure saliency does not affect investors’ perceptions of 
revenue corrections, which is inconsistent with the LAT. However, of the 79 revenue adjustments in 
this sample, only 19 are non-stealth ones, suggesting that low power could explain the insignificance of 
REV_INT. Under Method 2, COREEXPENSES has a significantly positive coefficient, and its interaction 
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with the stealth dummy has a significantly negative coefficient, which is very similar in absolute 
magnitude to that of COREEXPENSES. In other words, non-stealth misstatements that are core expenses 
have positive reactions, but when the same news is disclosed stealthily, the reaction vanishes. Although 
this result is inconsistent with our expectations, we believe it is likely to be a statistical artefact given 
that it appears only in one of the four model estimations. Among the other misstatement characteristics 
and firm-level control variables, the STEALTH and EARNINGS_SURPRISE variables have significantly 
positive coefficients, but only when beta-adjusted CAR variables estimated with Model 1 are used as 
dependent variables.  
4.3 Additional tests 
Untabulated statistics show that for 525 of 703 firm-years23, disclosure of the misstatement news occurs 
on the earnings announcement date, suggesting that earnings news could attenuate the reaction to 
misstatement news.24 We conduct additional tests to shed light on this potential explanation for our 
results. Most of these additional test results are not tabulated for brevity. First, we examine if the 
EARNINGS_SURPRISE control variable affects the inferences about our test variables. We estimated 
Models 5 and 6 without EARNINGS_SURPRISE. We then re-measured earnings surprise by creating 
dummies equal to unity if the magnitude of earnings surprise is in the bottom or top 5th, 10th and 25th 
percentiles, and if the earnings surprise is positive and then by scaling the change in earnings by the 
beginning of fiscal year market value of equity instead of total assets. We also ran our tests on a smaller 
sample totalling 90 observations, by using the mean/median consensus analysts’ earnings estimate 
minus the actual earnings standardized by the absolute value of the mean/median consensus analysts’ 
earnings estimate (Duru and Reeb, 2002) instead of EARNINGS_SURPRISE. Estimates for the test 
variables from all these regressions are similar to those in Tables 6 and 7, although we do observe a 
negative coefficient for STEALTH coefficient when we used the analysts’ forecasts to measure earnings 
surprise.25  
                                                            
23 One firm did not disclose its current-year earnings, but it did disclose sufficient information about its error for 
inclusion in our dataset totalling 704 firm years. 
24 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
25 We were able to match 167 observations with the IBES database but there were many stale-date forecasts. When 
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Second, we split the sample based on whether disclosure of the misstatement news occurred on the same 
date as the earnings announcement or not, and estimated the model for each group.26 Results showed 
that NEGEARNEQ and REV were generally negative and significant for the group where disclosure of 
misstatement news occurred on the same date as the earnings announcement; and REV was generally 
negative and significant for the other group. We further examined the weak results for the test variables 
for the sample where disclosure of the misstatement news occurred on a different date than earnings, by 
removing STEALTH, outliers greater than 5% of the regression residuals and then the dummy controls.27 
These extra tests did not change our inferences about the test variables. To formally test for differences 
between these two groups, we interacted the misstatement test variables with a dummy equal to unity 
when disclosure of the misstatement news occurred on the same date as the earnings announcement and 
zero otherwise (NEWS_SAME_EARN), and included these variables in the model. Results, using the full 
sample, showed that the coefficients for the interactions with REV and with COREEXPENSES are 
significant and positive for two of the regressions; indicating that returns are weaker for revenue and 
core expenses adjustments when they are disclosed on the earnings announcement date. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that earnings news attenuates the investor reaction to misstatement news. A 
possible reason for the insignificance of the coefficient on the NEWS_SAME_EARN and NEGEARNEQ 
interaction is, that the magnitudes of the earnings’ corrections could be smaller when disclosed on a 
different date to the earnings announcement, than when they are not; and that the market regards small 
magnitudes of NEGEARNEQ as less important than large magnitudes. Therefore, as our final test, we 
explored the effect of differences in magnitude of error corrections on these results for NEGEARNEQ. 
We compared the means and medians of the percentage changes in earnings for NEGEARNEQ between 
the two groups.28 Results showed that the NEGEARNEQ variable’s means and medians are significantly 
lower for the group whose misstatement news is released on the earnings announcement date. We then 
estimated a logit regression where the dependent variable is NEWS_SAME_EARN. Given the univariate 
                                                            
we limit the sample to those forecasts within 31 days before the earnings announcement date, our sample size fell 
to 90 observations. The coefficient estimate for earnings surprise was generally insignificant in these regressions. 
26 The sample size for misstatements news released on the same (different) date as earnings totals 452 (142). 
27 We thank the reviewer for suggesting these tests. 
28 We use earnings here rather than equity because a large portion of earnings corrections are due to share-based 
payment errors, which have no effect on equity. Using equity would eliminate these corrections from this analysis. 
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results, we included the following variables in this regression: NEGNI_EFFECT_BIG measured as unity 
if the correction to earnings is negative and large (defined as less than the median of negative earnings 
corrections) and zero otherwise; NEGNI_EFFECT_SMALL measured as unity if the correction to 
earnings is negative and it is small and zero otherwise; and POSNI_EFFECT measured as unity if the 
correction to earnings is positive and zero otherwise. Misstatement error corrections that do not change 
earnings are the reference group. The percentages of sample observations are 16, 16, 17 and 51 for each 
of these four groups, respectively. We included REV, COREEXPENSES, FRAUD, NUMERRORS and 
MISSTATEMENTLAG in the model because each of these variables measures attributes of more serious 
misstatements. STEALTH is included because firms that disclose misstatement news only in a periodic 
filing may also release that news on the earnings announcement date.29 The other control variables are 
SIZE, LEV, ROA, BIG4 and AGE. The results in the first two columns of Table 8, show that 
NEGNI_EFFECT_BIG, REV and COREEXPENSES have higher odds of disclosure on the earnings 
announcement date than non-core earnings corrections and those that do not affect earnings. Corrections 
for older errors and errors reported only in periodic filings are more likely to be disclosed on the earnings 
announcement date, as the positive coefficients for MISSTATEMENTLAG and STEALTH indicate. We 
find that the odds are higher for fraud-related misstatement news to be disclosed on a date other than the 
earnings announcement date. No control coefficient is significant except for SIZE and AGE. Larger 
(older) clients have higher (lower) odds of disclosing misstatement news on the earnings announcement 
date. To further explore the relations between NEWS_SAME_EARN, STEALTH and the misstatement 
variables, we interacted the misstatement variables with STEALTH. Results in the last two columns of 
Table 8 show that all interaction coefficients are insignificant; indicating no difference in the saliency 
of these corrections. Results (untabulated) from t-tests and Wilcoxon tests of differences in the 
percentage change in earnings for the stealth versus non-stealth groups for the sample where 
misstatement news is disclosed on the earnings announcement date; are insignificant, consistent with 
these regression results. We also estimated the model on the sample of firms that announce their earnings 
on the same date as the release of misstatement news (N = 452), and the coefficient for the interaction 
                                                            
29 The correlation coefficient between STEALTH and NEWS_SAME_EARN is +0.57, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to cause problems with the estimates. 
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term between STEALTH and NEGEARNEQ is highly significant and positive. This finding is consistent 
with the results in Table 7 and the argument that disclosure saliency improves the impounding of 
misstatement information into prices.30 Taken together, these additional test results suggest that the 
weaker investor reactions for negative earnings or equity corrections and for core expenses, reported in 
Tables 6 and 7, are due to the more important types of earnings corrections disclosed on the same date 
as earnings is announced, and that investor attention is limited.  
5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper provides evidence on the quality of Australia’s financial reporting, recently been called into 
question by the ASIC. For ASX-listed firms over an eight-year period through 2013, we document 
accounting misstatement frequency, misstatement severity and the timeliness of disclosures about 
misstatements. We examine investor reaction to the announcement of misstatement news and to various 
accounting issues associated with misstatements. Our tests shed light on whether Australian stock 
market participants treat misstatements as ‘bad news’, speaking to the quality of financial reporting in 
Australia. In a test of the limited attention theory (LAT) and following recent U.S. research, we also 
examine whether misstatement disclosure salience is an important moderator in the relation between 
misstatement announcement returns and misstatement issues.  
We find 4.1% of firm-years with a misstatement. The percentages vary widely by year, with the peak of 
6.3% in the 2009 year and the minimum of 3.4% in the 2013 year. We find that for 79% of misstatement 
firm years, firms do not highlight their errors by disclosing them, for example, in a press release, in a 
separate note, or in the ASX announcement heading. Instead, these errors are disclosed only in the half-
year or annual financial reports. Consequently, investors seem to wait for almost 8 months (the median 
is 239 days) for news about most misstatements. Consistent with prior U.S. evidence, most 
misstatements that correct prior-period earnings or equity are negative – the median percentage 
                                                            
30 For the sample where NEGEARNEQ = 1, we performed t-tests and Wilcoxon tests of the difference in the 
percentage change in earnings and of the difference in the percentage change in equity, between the stealth and 
non-stealth groups for the sub-sample that released misstatement news on the same date as earnings news.  All p-
values (two-tailed) from these tests were above 0.3. Given that the mean/median differences for the percentage 
change in earnings for NEGEARNEQ are insignificant, magnitudes of this type of misstatement correction across 
the stealth and non-stealth categories are not likely to explain the results. 
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decreases are 4.9 and 1.3, respectively. We find that large negative earnings, revenue, and core expenses 
corrections, are more likely to be disclosed on the same date as earnings is announced, than other types 
of misstatement corrections. This evidence is consistent with ASIC’s recent concerns about financial 
reporting quality in Australia. We acknowledge an unavoidable limitation common in this research 
stream, namely, that unreported errors may affect our inferences.31  
Regarding investor response to misstatement news, univariate tests show that CARs centred on the 
announcement date are insignificant for the full sample, but are equal to -1.5% for misstatements that 
change earnings or equity and -2.4% for those that reduce earnings or equity. In multivariate tests, 
misstatements that reduce earnings or equity have a coefficient estimate of -2.8%, and misstatements 
that affect revenue have a coefficient estimate of -1.7%. We find that firms that disclose misstatements 
less saliently experience CARs of between 1.3% and 2.7% higher than the firms that highlight them. 
Higher disclosure saliency increases the strength of the negative reaction to misstatements that reduce 
earnings or equity, consistent with the LAT and U.S. evidence. We find little evidence of reactions for 
most accounting issues associated with misstatements.  
Collectively, our evidence indicates that investors generally react to the more serious accounting 
misstatements and the reactions are less negative and weaker for misstatements disclosed stealthily. For 
policymakers, our study has two takeaway messages. First, conditional on detected misstatements being 
disclosed, accounting quality in Australia seems to have improved in recent years using misstatement 
frequency as the quality proxy, suggesting that major changes to current oversight work are not required. 
Finally, while the frequency of misstatements has fallen, the majority of misstatement disclosures have 
low saliency, possibly contributing to a sluggish impounding of that information into prices. 
Pronouncements that improve disclosure saliency could be beneficial to market pricing. 
                                                            
31 We thank an anonymous reviewer for noting this. 
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Appendix 1 – Sample construction method 
A.1 Identification of a misstatement 
We use the definition from Auditing Standard ASA 200, Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor 
and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with Australian Auditing Standards, to identify a 
misstatement for inclusion in our dataset, namely, “…a difference between the amount, classification, 
presentation, or disclosure of a reported financial report item and the amount, classification, 
presentation, or disclosure that is required for the item to be in accordance with the applicable financial 
reporting framework.  Misstatements can arise from error or fraud.” (ASA200, para 13.4(i)). We further 
refine our scope by including only misstatements of audited accounting information. Thus, we exclude 
misstatements of items in interim financial reports of other unaudited accounting information, such as 
unaudited preliminary reports. We exclude firms that do not comply with Australian GAAP, such as 
foreign firms and entities that prepare special-purpose financial reports, in the interest of consistency in 
financial reporting regulatory requirements. We also exclude firms that misstated a reporting period 
prior to listing but disclosed the error after listing. For these firms, it is unclear if the misstated accounts 
had to be audited. We exclude re-issuances of financial reports for administrative reasons, such as cases 
in which the wrong reports were lodged or typographical errors were made. Consequently, our reported 
error frequencies are less than the total frequency of errors in accounting information lodged with the 
ASX.32 Misstatements caused by accounting policy and accounting standard changes, tax rate changes, 
revisions of acquisition accounting attributable to new information, misstatements caused by 
discontinued operations and capitalization changes (e.g., bonus share issues) are excluded because they 
do not meet the definition above.33 Thus, our dataset includes both errors in audited financial statements 
(see AASB 108, para 5) and errors in and omissions from remuneration information in the directors’ 
                                                            
32 In recent years, the re-issuance of audited accounts has become more common. Often, a firm provides no 
information about the reason for the re-issuance. As noted, we only included these firms when earnings or equity 
changed and it was clear that the reason for the re-issuance was an error. This aspect of our data-collection method 
understates the quantity of misstatements at a further extent in more recent times. 
33 Some misstatements disclosed as accounting policy changes could be errors. As an example, Medtech Global 
Limited preliminary financial report for 2010 disclosed the reason for its 2009 financial report misstatement as an 
error, but its audited financial report disclosed the reason as an accounting policy change. 
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report for firms listed on the ASX that comply with Australian GAAP and prepare general-purpose 
financial reports.  
A.2 Information Sources for Misstatements 
The first source of information is half-year and annual audited financial reports lodged with the ASX 
for all listed and delisted firms from January 2006 through April 2014. Since our final sample financial 
year is 2013, we search until 30 April 2014 to allow sufficient time for December-year-end firms to 
lodge their annual accounts. These reports were searched for the following keywords: “amend” or 
"restate" or "correct" or "prior period" or "prior-period" or "prior year" or "prior-year" or “error” or 
“revise” or “investigat” or “errat” or “replace” or “irregular” or re-issue” or “reissue” to provide a list 
of possible misstatements. Two research assistants independently read each case of a potential 
misstatement and coded them as a “misstatement” or “unknown”. The percentage of agreement between 
them for “misstatement” was 65%. An author of this paper checked the coding and corrected it where 
necessary.  
Our second source of information is the content of ASX announcements. Specifically, for each 
misstatement identified in the financial report, we search the content of all ASX announcements lodged 
in the period since the previous audited annual financial report, a period up to nine months, for the 
abovementioned keywords. We read each announcement and recorded the dates of announcements 
about the misstatement. For misstatements disclosed in the annual reports, we found only a small number 
of announcements outside half-year financial reports indicating that most misstatements are stealth (see 
Table 2, Panel B). When we locate news about a misstatement in a transcript, we use the date of the 
podcast, because transcripts are usually lodged after the podcast (see, for example, KMD’s transcript of 
16 November 2012 lodged on the ASX website on 19 November 2012). For misstatements that change 
recognized information, we also examined the previously-lodged financial reports within this period. 
We found several cases were firms changed comparatives in line with the correction of the error, but 
gave no other information about the misstatement at that time. We recorded the dates and relevant 
information for these observations. These observations raise an issue about event dates, which we 
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discuss below. We did not search the content of all ASX announcements for all listed firms because of 
the large size of that task and we acknowledge this limitation in our data-collection method.  
Our third information source is the ASX announcement headlines. We searched for the abovementioned 
keywords in these headlines for all listed and delisted firms from January 2006 through April 2014. We 
identified several misstatements disclosed by re-issuing a financial report or portions thereof were in 
this search. We found a number of cases where amended audited financial reports were reissued on the 
same day or shortly after the original audited financial reports’ releases, but with no information about 
the reason for the re-issuances. We yielded to the size of the task of comparing all the information across 
both financial reports and compared only the two sets of financial statements for evidence of a 
misstatement. In this manner, we found one misstatement case. We acknowledge this limitation in our 
data-collection method.  
Our fourth source of misstatement information is action against the companies or their directors. We 
read all ASIC media releases34 from the ASIC website from 2006 to 2013 and recorded dates for which 
we found information about a misstatement case. Most of these dates are stale; that is, they were released 
after other releases. 
Our fifth source of information is press releases. We searched Factiva and Google News for all 
Australian publications from 2006 to 2013 for the abovementioned keywords and then for the names of 
all ASX-listed companies in a second search. We used the current names for each financial year since 
some Australian firms change their names. Most of the data obtained from these sources were for firms 
already identified using the above sources and were stale. However, we did identify a small number of 
extra cases using this second search, such as Westpac’s 2006 misstatement, described as an “over-
accrual”.  
We recorded the date of public release for each misstatement event for each of these sources. 
                                                            
34 ASIC releases information about its investigations, including those under s13 of the ASIC Act 2001, and 
regulatory actions such as enforceable undertakings. ASIC’s policy statement is available at: 
http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1339124/INFO_152_Public_Comment.pdf 
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A.3 Identification of misstatement event dates 
We list all dates about the misstatement from the sources mentioned above. 
As noted, in examining the ASX announcements, we examined the comparatives of the financial reports 
lodged prior to the misstatement financial report to determine whether they were changed in line with 
what was disclosed in the misstatement financial report. We found some firms did so for no stated 
reason, a situation that occurred most often in unaudited preliminary reports and sometimes in other 
reports such as half-year reports. One example is World Titanium Resources Limited’s (previously 
Bondi Mining Limited) reclassification of its cash and accounts payable balances on 30 June 2010. The 
reclassification occurred first in its 31 December 2010 half-year report, lodged with the ASX on 15 
March 2011. An explanation for this reclassification occurred first in its June 2011 annual financial 
report, lodged with the ASX on 27 September 2011. Since the reason for the change was known at its 
half-year lodgement date but not explained to the market at that time, we record the date of 15 March 
2011. It is arguable whether dates such as 15 March 2011 for World Titanium Resources Limited are 
the “earliest release dates” in our study because firms can change recognized information for accounting 
policy changes, for example. In our main tests, we do not use these dates as the earliest release date; 
rather, we use the earliest date when the information about an error was released.  
As in Karpoff et al. (2017), we sum the abnormal returns over all unique event dates in our Method 2. 
Specifically, we examine each disclosure of error information and identify those disclosures that are 
materially different from the previously disclosed information. Some judgement is used. For example, 
if a firm changed the amount of the correction to the prior period but that change is less than 5% of the 
previous amount, we exclude it. If a firm provided only the restated prior-period half-year earnings in 
the initial disclosure, perhaps because its initial disclosure was included in the half-year accounts, and 
provided the restated annual earnings in its annual accounts, then we include it. We also include cases 
in which the comparatives were changed in line with the restated accounts, with no other information 
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about the error. In other cases, it is clear that the information is “new”. For example, a new error may 
be disclosed in subsequent releases and cause material changes to the number of existing errors. 
A.4 Classification of Accounting Issues 
Our research assistants classified the errors into accounting issues following the Audit Analytics method 
in Scholz (2013), in the absence of an Australian classification scheme and for comparability with 
similar studies. Appendix 2 shows the accounting issue definitions and descriptions for this scheme. 
Because U.S. GAAP differs from Australian GAAP, we modified the classification scheme by including 
misstatements of upward noncurrent asset revaluations in the INVESTING category and misstatements 
of audited information in director’s reports in the FNOTEDIR category. An author of this paper checked 
the coding and made necessary changes.  
A.5 Identification of date of most recent incorrect accounts 
The variable Error lag is measured as the number of days since the last lodging of an audited annual 
financial report with no information about the misstatement. In most cases, this date is the most recent 
lodging date of the prior year’s annual financial report. In some cases, we use the preliminary report for 
the misstatement year when it is audited, provided that the error relates to a disclosure contained therein. 
For example, some disclosures, such as detailed executive remuneration disclosures, are not required in 
the preliminary report, thus, assigning the date of the preliminary report to an error would be 
inappropriate. In such cases, we use the previous year’s annual report lodging date instead. 
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Appendix 2 – Variable Names and Variable Definitions for Accounting Issues 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
 
Accounting Issues: Business activities 
REV The error is associated with revenue recognition.  
EXPACCRESEST The error is associated with the expensing of assets or understatement of 
liabilities, the accrual or identification of liabilities on the balance sheet, or 
with cash, accounts receivable, loans collectible, investments allowance for 
uncollectables, notes receivable, or related reserves.  
EXPSTOCK The error is associated with the recording of deferred, stock based or 
executive compensation.  
EXPCOS The error is associated with transactions affecting inventory, vendor 
relationships or cost of sales.  
EXPCAPDEPAM The error is associated with the capitalization of expenditures or depreciation 
of assets, amortization of assets or amortization of debt premiums or 
discounts.  
EXPPENCONLEA The error is associated with pensions or other post-retirement plans or benefits 
or leases.  
TAX The error is associated with various forms of tax obligations or benefits.  
INVESTING The error is associated with the recording of assets, goodwill, intangible or 
contra liabilities that are required to be valued or assessed for diminution in 
value on a periodic basis, the recording of gains or losses from the sales of 
assets, interests, entities or liabilities, or upward revaluations of non-current 
assets. 
FINANCING The error is associated with the recording of debt or equity accounts or 
derivative instruments.  
 
Accounting Issues: Financial statement presentation 
CFMISS The error is associated with the cash-flow statement classification errors.  
ISMISSEPS The error is associated with the disclosure of financial/operational ratios or 
margins and earnings per share calculation issues or where income statement 
items are misclassified instruments.  
DEQMISS The error is associated with the proper classification of a debt instrument as 
short term or long term or between debt and equity accounts. 
FNOTEDIR The error is associated with a financial statement, footnote or segment 
reporting information or the director’s report. 
ASSETMISS The error is associated with how assets were classified on the balance sheet.  
COMPINC The error is associated with comprehensive income.  
 
Accounting Issues: Subsidiary accounting and atypical transactions 
SUBSID The error is associated with intercompany or associate balances, investment 
valuations or transactions, disclosures about related, alliance, affiliated or 
subsidiary entities.  
CONSOL The error is associated with the consolidation of subsidiaries, off balance sheet 
arrangements and joint ventures.  
REORG The error is associated with mergers, acquisitions, disposals, reorganizations 
or discontinued operation accounting issues.  
 
Accounting issues in Panel A are adapted from Audit Analytics as in Scholz (2013). 
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Appendix 3 – Variables Used in Regression Models Explaining Misstatement Characteristics 
Variable Definition Expected sign and supporting literature 
  
ERRORYEAR = unity if the firm had an error that fiscal year that was subsequently corrected and zero 
otherwise.  
 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets at year-end plus one dollar. (–) Francis et al. (2013), (+) Agrawal and Chandha 2005, (–) Blankley 
et al. (2012), (–) Srinavasan et al. (2015), (–) Sue et al. (2013) 
 LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets at year-end, with the extreme values winsorized at their 2.5th 
and 97.5th percentiles. 
(+) Wang and Wu (2011), (–) McGuire et al. (2012), (+) Blankley et al. 
(2012), (+) Sue et al. (2013) 
ROA = Earnings divided by total assets at year-end, with the extreme values winsorized at their 2.5th and 
97.5th percentiles. 
(–) Wang and Wu (2011), (–) McGuire et al. (2012) 
LOSS = An indicator variable that equals to one if earnings is negative and zero otherwise. (+) Hennes et al. (2008), (+) Francis et al. (2013), (+) McGuire et al. 
(2012) 
BIG4 = An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s auditor is Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and 
Young, KPMG or PwC and zero otherwise. 
(–) McGuire et al. (2012) 
UNOP = An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s audit opinion in its audit report is unclean, and 
zero otherwise. 
(+) Sue et al. (2013) 
AGE = The natural logarithm of the number of years since listing on the ASX to the misstatement year plus 
1. 
(+) Wang and Wu (2011) 
 LAF = The natural logarithm of the total of the client’s audit fees. (+) Francis et al. (2013) 
OFF = The natural logarithm of the number of firms audited by the firm’s audit office in the current year. (–) Francis et al. (2013) 
NEW = An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s auditor is new in the current year and zero 
otherwise. 
(+) Francis et al. (2013) 
MINE = An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s industry is Basic Resources and zero otherwise. (–) 
TECH = An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s industry is Technology and zero otherwise. (+) 
IFRS = An indicator variable that equals to one if the fiscal year is 2006 or 2007 and zero otherwise. (+) Goodwin et al. (2008) 
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Appendix 4 – Extra Variable Names and Variable Definitions for Variables used in Tests 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
 
COREEXPENSES Unity if an accounting issue is for EXPACCRESEST, EXPSTOCK, EXPCOS, 
EXPCAPDEPAM or EXPPENCONLEA and zero otherwise. 
CONSOL_EQ_TA The amount of the correction to opening equity divided by total assets at the 
end of the prior financial year.  
EARNINGS_SURPRISE The change in earnings scaled by beginning of period total assets. When a 
misstatement is initially disclosed in half-year accounts, we measure change 
in earnings as half-year earnings less the previous corresponding half-year 
earnings as disclosed in those half-year accounts. Otherwise we measure 
change in earnings as annual earnings less the previous years’ annual 
earnings as disclosed in those annual accounts. 
FRAUD Unity if the words “fraud” or “irregularity” appear in the disclosure and zero 
otherwise.  
MISSTATEMENTLAG The number of years from the misstatement year to the earliest error year. 
NEGEARNEQ Unity if the net effect on prior period’s consolidated earnings or equity is 
negative and zero otherwise. 
NEGNI_EFFECT_BIG Unity if the percentage change to earnings is negative and is less than the 
median of all negative percentage changes to earnings and zero otherwise. 
NEGNI_EFFECT_SMALL Unity if the percentage change to earnings is negative and is greater than or 
equal to the median of all negative percentage changes to earnings and less 
than zero and zero otherwise. 
NEWS_SAME_EARN  Unity if the initial disclosure about the misstatement error is on the same date 
as the earnings announcement date and zero otherwise. 
NONSTEALTH Unity if there is disclosure about the misstatement error other than in the 
Half-Year Report or the Financial Year Report and zero otherwise. 
NUMERRORS The number of errors associated with a misstatement. 
POSEARNEQ Unity if the net effect on prior period’s consolidated earnings or equity is 
positive and zero otherwise.  
POSNI_EFFECT Unity if the percentage change to earnings is positive and zero otherwise. 
STEALTH Unity if the error is disclosed in the Half-Year Report or the Financial Year 
Report and there is no additional disclosure about the misstatement and zero 
otherwise.  
  
 
  
40 
 
References 
Adams, J.C., D.K. Hayunga, and S.J. Rasmussen, 2015, The restating of financial statements by REITs, 
Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance,1-22. 
Agrawal, A., and S. Chandha, 2005, Corporate governance and accounting scandals, Journal of Law 
and Economics 48, 371-406. 
Ahmed, K., and J. Goodwin, 2007, An empirical investigation of earnings restatements by Australian 
firms, Accounting & Finance 47, 1-22.  
Anderson, K.L., and T.L. Yohn, 2002, The effect of 10-k restatements on firm value, information 
asymmetries, and investors’ reliance on earnings, Working paper (Georgetown University): 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=332380 
Atiase, R. K., 1985, Predisclosure information, firm capitalization and security return behavior around 
earnings announcements, Journal of Accounting Research 23, 21-36. 
Ball, R., A. Robin, and J.S. Wu, 2003, Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting income in 
four East Asian countries, Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 235-270. 
Bardos, K.S., J.H. Golec, and J. P. Harding, 2013, Litigation risk and market reaction to restatements, 
Journal of Financial Research 36, 19-42. 
Blankley, A.I., D.N. Hurtt, and J.E. MacGregor, 2012, Abnormal audit fees and restatements, Auditing: 
A journal of Practice and Theory 31, 79-96. 
Cochran, W.G., and G.M., Cox, G.M., 1950. Experimental Design, 1st Ed., John Wiley, New York. 
DeFond, M. and J. Zhang, 2014, A review of archival auditing research. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 58, 275-326.  
Desai, H., C.E. Hogan, and M.S. Wilkins, 2006, The reputational penalty for aggressive accounting: 
earnings restatements and management turnover, The Accounting Review 81, 83-112.  
Doyle, J.T., Ge, W., and McVay, S.E., 2007, Determinants of weaknesses in internal control over 
financial reporting, Journal of Accounting and Economics 44, 93-223. 
Duru, A., and Reeb, D.M., 2002. International diversification and analysts’ forecast accuracy and bias. 
The Accounting Review 77, 415-433. 
Elliott, J.A., and J. D. Hanna, 1996, Repeated accounting write-offs and the information content of 
earnings, Journal of Accounting Research 34, 135-155.  
Fama, E.F., 1970, Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical work, The Journal of 
Finance 25, 383-417.  
Fama, E.F., and K.R. French, 1993, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, Journal of 
Financial Economics 33, 3-56. 
Fan, J., and T.J. Wong, 2002, Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting 
earnings in East Asia, Journal of Accounting and Economics 33, 401-425. 
41 
 
Ferreira, M.A., and P.P. Matos, 2008, The colors of investors’ money: the role of institutional investors 
around the world, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 499-533.  
Files, R., D.E.P. Swanson, and S. Tse, 2009, Stealth disclosure of accounting restatements, The 
Accounting Review 84, 1495-1520.  
Files, R., N.Y. Sharp, and A.M. Thompson, 2014, Empirical evidence on repeat restatements, 
Accounting Horizons 28, 93-123. 
 
Francis, J.R. and J.L. Gunn, 2015, Industry Accounting Complexity and Earnings Properties: Does 
Auditor Industry Expertise Matter? Working paper: 
https://www.uts.edu.au/sites/default/files/AccDG_Francis%20Gunn__WP%202015.pdf 
 
Francis, J., P.N. Michas, and M. Yu, 2013, Office size of Big 4 auditors and client restatements, 
Contemporary Accounting Research 30, 1626–1661. 
Francis, J., and M.D. Yu, 2009, Big 4 office size and audit quality, The Accounting Review 84, 1521-
1552. 
Freeman, R.N., 1987, The association between accounting earnings and security returns for large and 
small firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics 9, 195–228. 
Gallagher, D. R., P. A. Gardner, and P. L. Swan, 2013, Governance through trading: institutional swing 
trades and subsequent firm performance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42, 427-458. 
Gleason, C. A., N.T.  Jenkins, and W.B. Johnson, 2008, The contagion effects of accounting 
restatements, The Accounting Review 83, 83-110. 
Goodwin, J., B. Cooper, and S. Johl, 2008, How prepared was Australia for international financial 
reporting standards? The case of listed firms, Australian Accounting Review 18, 35-45. 
Gow, I.D., G. Ormazabal, and D.J. Taylor, 2010, Correcting for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence in accounting research, The Accounting Review 85, 483-512. 
Griffin, J.M., Hirschey, N.H., and P.J. Kelly, 2011, How important is the financial media in global 
markets? The Review of Financial Studies 24, 3941-3992. 
Hennes, K., A. Leone, and B. Miller, 2008, The importance of distinguishing errors from irregularities 
in restatement research: the case of restatements and CEO/CFO turnover, The Accounting Review 83, 
1487-519. 
Hirschey, M., K.R. Smith, and W.M. Wilson, 2015, The timeliness of restatement disclosures and 
financial reporting credibility, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 42, 826-859. 
Hirshleifer, D., and S.H. Teoh, 2003, Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 337-386. 
Hribar, P., and N.T. Jenkins, 2004, The effect of accounting restatements on earnings revisions and the 
estimated cost of capital, Review of Accounting Studies 9, 337-356. 
Kahneman, D., 1973. Attention and Effort (Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ.) 
Karpoff, J.M., A. Koester, D.S. Lee, and G.S. Martin, 2017, Proxies and databases in financial 
misconduct research, Accounting Review 92, 129-163. 
42 
 
Kinney, W.R. Jr., and L. S. McDaniel, 1989, Characteristics of firms correcting previously reported 
quarterly earnings, Journal of Accounting and Economics 11, 71-93. 
Legg, M.J., 2008, The transformation of a share price fall into litigation – shareholder class actions in 
Australia, Paper presented at the Corporate Law Teachers Association Conference, Sydney. 
http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2008/2008ML_TSPFL.pdf 
Luo, X., R. Zhang, W. Zhang, and J. Aspara, 2014, Do institutional investors pay attention to customer 
satisfaction and why? Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 42, 119-136. 
McGuire, S.T., T.C. Omer, and N.Y. Sharp, 2012, The impact of religion on financial reporting 
irregularities, The Accounting Review 87, 645-673. 
Morabito, V., 2010, An empirical study of Australia’s class action regimes, second report, Australian 
Government, Australian Research Council: 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Vince%20Morabito%202nd%20Re
port.pdf 
Murphy, J.B., 2013, The operation of Australia’s class action regime-2013:  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/FedJSchol/2013/43.html 
Myers, L., S. Scholz and N.Y. Sharp, 2013, Restating under the radar? Determinants of restatement 
disclosure choices and the related market reactions, Working paper (University of Arkansas). 
Owers, J.E., C.M. Lin, and R.C. Rogers, 2002, The informational content and valuation ramifications 
of earnings restatements, International Business and Economics Research Journal 1, 71–84. 
Palmrose, Z., V.J. Richardson, and S. Scholz, 2004, Determinants of market reactions to restatement 
announcements, Journal of Accounting and Economics 37, 59-89. 
Palmrose, Z., and S. Scholz, 2004, The circumstances and legal consequences of non-GAAP reporting: 
Evidence from restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research 21, 139-180. 
Scholz, S., 2008, The changing nature and consequences of public company financial restatements 
1996-2007, The Department of Treasury, April. Available at: 
http://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/uploaded/ResourceCenter/FinancialRestatements_1997_2006.p
df 
Scholz, S., 2013, Financial restatement trends in the United States: 2003:2012, Center for Audit Quality, 
Washington, D.C: http://thecaq.org/reports-and-publications/financial-restatement-trends -in-the-
united-states-2003-2012/financial-restatement-trends-in-the-united-states-2003-2012 
 
Sellars, D.R., 2013, Accounting restatements: a review of the literature, Working paper (The American 
Accounting Association): http://www2.aaahq.org/AM2014/abstract.cfm?submissionID=2230 
Srinavasan, S., A.S. Wahid, and G. Yu, 2015, Admitting mistakes: home country effect on the reliability 
of restatement reporting, The Accounting Review 90, 1201-1240. 
Sue, S.H., C.L. Chin, and A.L. Chan, 2013, Exploring the causes of accounting restatements by family 
firms, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 40, 1068-1094. 
Wallace, W., 2000, The value relevance of accounting: the rest of the story, European Management 
Journal 18, 675-682. 
 
43 
 
Wang, V., and M. Wu, 2011, The quality of financial reporting in China: An examination from an 
accounting restatement perspective, China Journal of Accounting Research 4, 167-196. 
Xu, Y., A.L. Jiang, N. Fargher and E. Carson, 2011, Audit reports in Australia during the global financial 
crisis, Australian Accounting Review 21, 22-31. 
  
44 
 
  
TABLE 1 – Descriptive Statistics of Misstatement Firms 
 Panel A – Frequency of Misstatements by Fiscal Year and by Error Year 
  Fiscal Years Error Years 
  All Earliest 
Year N 
Listed 
firms %  N 
Listed 
firms % N 
Listed 
firms % 
        2006 63 3.8  94 5.5 94 5.5 
2007 95 5.3  111 6.1 103 5.7 
2008 110 5.6  116 6.0 100 5.2 
2009 122 6.3  86 4.5 82 4.4 
2010 99 5.1  75 3.8 70 3.7 
2011 79 4.0  64 3.5 61 3.3 
2012 71 3.7  52 2.8 46 2.4 
2013 65 3.4  9 0.5 9 0.5 
Totals:        
2006-2011 568 4.3  546 4.9 510 4.6 
2006-2013 704 4.1  607 4.1 565 3.8 
 
Panel B – Percentage of Misstating Firms by Industry 
Industry Name Misstating firms % Listed firms % 
Automobiles & Parts 0.9 0.5 
Banks 0.4 0.6 
Basic Resources 26.3 38.1 
Chemicals 1.0 0.9 
Construction & Materials 2.8 2.5 
Financial Services 8.4 9.0 
Food & Beverage 3.8 2.8 
Health Care 6.0 6.5 
Industrial Goods & Services 12.8 8.6 
Insurance 0.1 0.4 
Media 2.0 2.0 
Oil & Gas 8.5 8.1 
Personal & Household Goods 1.6 1.8 
Real Estate 6.4 5.2 
Retail 4.5 2.6 
Technology 7.2 4.3 
Telecommunications 2.4 1.3 
Travel & Leisure 2.7 2.1 
Utilities 1.4 1.6 
Unclassified 0.7 1.0 
Total  100.0 100.0 
   In Panel A, error years are understated more in recent sample years due to the misstatement lag - see 
Table 2, Panel C. Some firms disclose more than one error year in a misstatement year, causing the totals 
for Error Years All to be larger than the totals for Error Years Earliest. Ten earliest Error Years occur 
before the ASX listing and these cases are excluded from the Error Years data on the right side of Panel 
A.  Datastream industry classifications are used in Panel B.  
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TABLE 2 – Accounting Issues, Location of Initial Disclosure and Descriptive Statistics of 
Misstatements 
Panel A – Accounting issues 
 N % 
REV 92 13.1 
EXPACCRESEST 84 11.9 
EXPSTOCK 41 5.8 
EXPCOS 50 7.1 
EXPCAPDEPAM 54 7.7 
EXPPENCONLEA 13 1.8 
TAX 108 15.3 
INVESTING 71 10.1 
FINANCING 38 5.4 
CFMISS 15 2.1 
ISMISSEPS 35 5.0 
DEQMISS 50 7.1 
FNOTEDIR 145 20.6 
ASSETMISS 82 11.6 
COMPINC 25 3.6 
SUBSID 38 5.4 
CONSOL 61 8.7 
REORG 87 12.4 
Unspecified 11 1.6 
   
Panel B – Location of initial disclosure   
   
Half-year report 216 30.7 
Half-year report and Press 1 0.1 
Half-year report and Announcement 11 1.6 
Half-year report and Financial-year report 1 0.1 
Financial-year report  338 48.0 
Financial-year report and Press 1 0.1 
Financial-year report and Announcement 56 8.0 
Financial-year report, Press and Announcement 1 0.1 
Announcement 79 11.2 
   
Panel C – Descriptive statistics of misstatement variables 
 Min Median Mean Max Std dev N 
       MISSTATEMENTLAG 0 1 1.2 7 0.8 704 
Error lag 1 239 227.5 1,789 140.4 704 
NUMERRORS 1 1 1.4 8 0.8 704 
Number years restated 1 1 1.1 5 0.4 704 
Number accounting issues 1 1 1.6 10 0.9 704 
Earnings or equity change 0 1 0.6 1 0.5 704 
Earnings change (%) - 4,719.8 - 4.9 - 39.2 670.8 292.6 347 
Equity change (%) - 469.3 - 1.3 - 8.3 119.2 43.4 362 
       
In Panels A and B, % is the percentage of all misstatements. Percentages in Panel A do not total 100 because firms can have more 
than one accounting issue per misstatement. Percentages in Panel B do not total 100 due to rounding. Variable descriptions for 
Panel A are shown in Appendix 2. MISSTATEMENTLAG is the number of years from the misstatement year to the earliest year 
when an error was made. Error lag is the number of days from the lodgement date of the most recent previous incorrect audited 
financial report to the earliest date of the misstatement. NUMERRORS is the number of accounting errors identified in a 
misstatement. Number years restated is the number of financial years where the impact of the error is disclosed. When no data are 
provided, we set the value to one year. Number accounting issues is the number of issues from Panel A of this table. Earnings or 
equity change equals unity if the firm’s earnings or its equity decreased or increased and zero otherwise. Earnings change (%) is 
the cumulative correction to earnings divided by the sum of the absolute values of prior year’s reporting earnings(s). Equity change 
(%) is the correction to equity divided by prior-period equity. 
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Table 3 – Tests of Differences in Characteristics between Misstatement 
Firms and Control Firms 
Panel A - Univariate Tests of Differences in Characteristics 
 Mean   Median  
 Misstatement Firms 
Control 
Firms p-value  
Misstatement 
Firms 
Control 
Firms p-value 
SIZE 17.794 17.362 <0.01  17.580 17.072 <0.01 
LEV 0.464 0.407 0.01  0.388 0.240 <0.01 
ROA - 0.192 - 0.323 <0.01  - 0.014 - 0.054 <0.01 
LOSS 0.533 0.603 <0.01  1 1  
BIG4 0.410 0.458 0.04  0 0  
UNOP 0.233 0.208 0.15  0 0  
AGE 2.040 2.074 0.47  2.073 2.067 0.66 
LAF 11.616 11.196 <0.01  11.482 11.035 <0.01 
OFF 3.277 3.400 <0.01  3.526 3.689 <0.01 
NEW 0.125 0.105 0.11  0 0  
MINE 0.265 0.375 <0.01  0 0  
TECH 0.106 0.055 <0.01  0 0  
IFRS 0.386 0.317 <0.01  0 0  
        N 510 10,578   510 10,578  
        
Panel B - Results from Logistic Regression for Predicting Errors that Result in Misstatements 
(ERRORYEAR=1) 
 Cross-sectional 
(Model 1A) 
 Fixed-Effect 
(Model 1B)  
 Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  
SIZE - 0.004 0.947  0.197 0.016  
LEV 0.148 0.077  0.063 0.683  
ROA 0.286 0.001  0.006 0.959  
LOSS 0.082 0.435  - 0.026 0.860  
BIG4 - 0.615 0.001  - 0.478 0.080  
UNOP 0.291 0.059  0.315 0.061  
AGE - 0.140 0.088  - 0.662 0.001  
LAF 0.304 0.001  0.140 0.161  
OFF - 0.058 0.001  - 0.188 0.080  
NEW 0.211 0.017  - 0.072 0.637  
MINE - 0.273 0.047  - -  
TECH 0.518 0.001  - -  
IFRS 0.337 0.007  0.088 0.528  
Constant - 5.894 0.001  - -  
Firm-fixed Effects  No  Yes  
       
Nagelkerke R2 0.037  0.004  
Wald Chi sq 119.329 <0.01  38.511 <0.01  
N 11,088  2,313  
     
On the left side of Panel A, two-tailed p -values from t-tests for continuous variables and from Z-tests for categorical variables are 
shown in the comparisons of means. On the right side of Panel A, two-tailed p-values for continuous variables from the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test are shown in the comparisons of distributions. Continuous variables except for SIZE and OFF are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Panel B presents logistic regression results for errors that are subsequently corrected. The two-tailed p-values 
are shown. Coefficients and p-values less than 0.001 are shown as 0.001. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors clustered 
by firm and year as per Gow et al. (2010). See Appendix 3 for the definitions of the independent variables and for studies justifying the 
expected signs for the coefficients.  
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TABLE 4 – Abnormal Returns around Misstatement Announcements for All Firms and 
for Various Misstatement Partitions  
  METHOD 1 METHOD 2 
  BETA ADJ. MARKET ADJ. BETA ADJ. MARKET ADJ. 
 N Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean p-value 
Panel A - Full Sample          
Full Sample 594 -0.001 0.744 0.001 0.839 -0.009 0.152 -0.007 0.227 
          
Panel B - Effects on Earnings/Equity        
Earnings or Equity Change 362 -0.003 0.608 -0.001 0.798 -0.015 0.068 -0.015 0.080 
No Earnings or Equity Change 232 0.001 0.879 0.004 0.482 0.002 0.820 0.005 0.565 
Test of CAR Difference  -0.004 0.650 -0.006 0.486 -0.017 0.141 -0.019 0.094 
          
NEGEARNEQ 231 -0.010 0.123 -0.010 0.130 -0.023 0.032 -0.025 0.024 
POSEARNEQ 102 0.011 0.292 0.015 0.139 -0.009 0.565 -0.001 0.939 
Test of CAR Difference  -0.021 0.090 -0.025 0.039 -0.015 0.433 -0.024 0.183 
          
Panel C - Accounting Issue          
REV 79 -0.016 0.212 -0.017 0.184 -0.014 0.506 -0.021 0.310 
EXPACCRESEST 64 0.009 0.463 0.011 0.399 -0.001 0.938 -0.009 0.612 
EXPSTOCK 36 0.010 0.411 0.014 0.234 -0.005 0.792 0.008 0.716 
EXPCOS 40 -0.008 0.705 -0.019 0.360 0.012 0.718 -0.008 0.817 
EXPCAPDEPAM 44 0.001 0.996 -0.004 0.833 -0.002 0.943 -0.015 0.646 
EXPPENCONLEA 4 -0.009 0.858 -0.018 0.764 0.007 0.778 -0.011 0.809 
TAX 98 -0.003 0.731 -0.004 0.639 -0.022 0.140 -0.024 0.109 
INVESTING 58 0.006 0.607 0.009 0.459 0.005 0.817 0.007 0.751 
FINANCING 27 -0.015 0.311 -0.012 0.415 -0.002 0.948 -0.009 0.740 
CFMISS 13 0.016 0.422 0.016 0.392 0.013 0.677 0.004 0.900 
ISMISSEPS 29 -0.005 0.722 -0.005 0.771 -0.029 0.246 -0.032 0.246 
DEQMISS 38 -0.025 0.214 -0.022 0.296 -0.010 0.745 -0.001 0.988 
FNOTEDIR 115 0.004 0.555 0.010 0.129 0.000 0.973 0.004 0.649 
ASSETMISS 64 0.001 0.890 0.002 0.870 0.003 0.857 0.004 0.769 
COMPINC 22 -0.008 0.692 -0.001 0.969 -0.054 0.110 -0.050 0.152 
SUBSID 31 0.011 0.597 0.021 0.279 -0.002 0.955 0.012 0.649 
CONSOL 48 0.001 0.981 -0.001 0.949 -0.016 0.542 -0.018 0.498 
REORG 76 0.011 0.279 0.014 0.166 0.033 0.036 0.039 0.009 
UNSPECIFIED 11 -0.006 0.713 -0.008 0.618 -0.021 0.705 -0.024 0.687 
          
Panel D - Returns by Other Types of Severity       
FRAUD 12 -0.058 0.035 -0.054 0.067 -0.068 0.273 -0.087 0.215 
Number of Errors>1 139 -0.004 0.580 -0.003 0.698 -0.005 0.671 -0.007 0.568 
       
Panel E - Returns by Disclosure Salience       
STEALTH 477 0.002 0.665 0.004 0.372 -0.005 0.504 -0.003 0.718 
NONSTEALTH 117 -0.015 0.039 -0.013 0.087 -0.025 0.028 -0.027 0.023 
Test of CAR Difference  0.017 0.048 0.017 0.054 0.020 0.126 0.024 0.075 
Abnormal returns are computed either using a one-factor event study model or a simple market adjustment as described in Section 3.2. The results in this 
table use event date Method 1, which is the earliest date of information about the misstatement error, or Method 2, which uses all relevant dates for the 
misstatement case (see Appendix 1). p-values are from two-tailed t-tests. 
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TABLE 5 – Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in Regressions of Abnormal Returns 
 MIN P1 P5 P50 P95 P99 MAX MEAN SD 
CAR_MET1_BETAADJ -0.301 -0.301 -0.175 0.001 0.154 0.359 0.359 -0.001 0.097 
CAR_ MET1_MKTADJ -0.315 -0.315 -0.163 0 0.157 0.344 0.344 0.001 0.096 
CAR_MET2_BETAADJ -0.506 -0.506 -0.275 -0.004 0.211 0.516 0.516 -0.009 0.147 
CAR1_ MET2_MKTADJ -0.522 -0.522 -0.276 -0.003 0.218 0.507 0.507 -0.007 0.146 
          
NEGEARNEQ 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.389 0.488 
CONSOL_EQ_TA -1.138 -0.587 -0.102 0 0.039 0.237 0.771 -0.013 0.108 
REV 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.133 0.340 
COREEXPENSES 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.278 0.448 
FRAUD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.020 0.141 
STEALTH 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.803 0.398 
NUMERRORS 1 1 1 1 3 5 6 1.333 0.723 
SIZE 0 13.559 14.937 17.648 21.932 23.250 26.426 17.952 2.280 
ROA -10.099 -3.864 -1.303 -0.025 0.180 0.316 0.553 -0.244 0.916 
LEV 0.003 0.006 0.020 0.391 0.937 1.903 8.507 0.448 0.608 
EARNINGS_SURPRISE -1.800 -1.800 -0.560 -0.001 0.433 4.133 4.133 0.011 0.571 
This table presents extreme values, various percentiles and mean and standard deviation statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
used in the abnormal return regressions in Tables 6 and 7. Variable definitions are shown in Appendices 3 and 4. 
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TABLE 6 – OLS Regression Results for Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Misstatement 
Announcements  
  METHOD 1 METHOD 2 
 BETA ADJ. MARKET ADJ. BETA ADJ. MARKET ADJ. 
 Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
NEGEARNEQ -0.011 0.170 -0.013 0.166 -0.027 0.025 -0.028 0.028 
CONSOL_EQ_TA 0.043 0.342 0.037 0.384 0.022 0.818 0.021 0.801 
REV -0.015 0.030 -0.017 0.001 -0.005 0.687 -0.012 0.184 
COREEXPENSES 0.007 0.404 0.002 0.857 0.011 0.410 0.003 0.828 
FRAUD -0.040 0.203 -0.035 0.283 -0.033 0.612 -0.047 0.459 
STEALTH 0.014 0.026 0.013 0.045 0.024 0.077 0.025 0.040 
NUMERRORS 0.001 0.705 0.001 0.709 0.006 0.517 0.004 0.591 
SIZE -0.001 0.723 -0.002 0.270 0.005 0.126 0.003 0.268 
ROA 0.003 0.439 0.006 0.155 0.005 0.485 0.009 0.029 
LEV 0.001 0.951 -0.001 0.931 0.020 0.104 0.016 0.132 
EARNINGS_SURPRISE 0.006 0.030 0.006 0.095 0.007 0.464 0.010 0.255 
INTERCEPT 0.011 0.746 0.044 0.195 -0.121 0.048 -0.080 0.146 
         
Industry and Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj R-squared 3.27%  4.06%  3.10%  3.85%  
N 594  594  594  594  
This table presents OLS regression results for CARs that use event date Method 1, which is the earliest date of information about the 
misstatement and Method 2, which combines all relevant dates for the misstatement (see Appendix 1). Abnormal returns are computed either 
using a one-factor event study model or a simple market adjustment as described in Section 3. p-values are from two-tailed t-tests. Regressions 
are estimated with clustered standard errors by firm and year as per Gow et al. (2010). CARs are winsorized at their 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. 
Variable definitions are shown in Appendices 3 and 4. 
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TABLE 7 – OLS Regression Results for Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Misstatement 
Announcements: Interactions of Key Variables with Stealth Indicator 
 
 METHOD 1 METHOD 2 
 BETA ADJ. MARKET ADJ. BETA ADJ. MARKET ADJ. 
 Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
NEGEARNEQ -0.028 0.058 -0.034 0.051 -0.064 0.001 -0.063 0.003 
NEGEARNEQ_INT 0.021 0.191 0.025 0.119 0.043 0.003 0.042 0.018 
CONSOL_EQ_TA 0.023 0.425 0.011 0.699 0.020 0.512 -0.004 0.943 
CONSOL_EQ_TA_INT 0.033 0.371 0.040 0.320 0.015 0.886 0.041 0.737 
REV -0.001 0.963 -0.008 0.737 -0.019 0.711 -0.032 0.450 
REV_INT -0.017 0.463 -0.011 0.591 0.022 0.659 0.029 0.502 
COREEXPENSES 0.018 0.100 0.008 0.514 0.063 0.000 0.028 0.099 
COREEXPENSES_INT -0.012 0.495 -0.006 0.733 -0.061 0.002 -0.028 0.211 
FRAUD -0.037 0.276 -0.030 0.408 -0.030 0.645 -0.037 0.561 
STEALTH 0.013 0.070 0.008 0.275 0.019 0.250 0.014 0.307 
NUMERRORS 0.001 0.722 0.001 0.749 0.005 0.543 0.003 0.662 
SIZE -0.001 0.793 -0.002 0.352 0.005 0.120 0.004 0.233 
ROA 0.002 0.602 0.006 0.230 0.004 0.651 0.007 0.141 
LEV 0.001 0.963 -0.001 0.929 0.020 0.129 0.016 0.146 
EARNINGS_SURPRISE 0.006 0.048 0.006 0.126 0.008 0.409 0.010 0.258 
INTERCEPT 0.009 0.800 0.043 0.227 -0.120 0.037 -0.078 0.131 
         
Industry and Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared 3.43%  4.25%  3.64%  4.24%  
N 594  594  594  594  
This table presents OLS regressions results for CARs, which use event date Method 1, which is the earliest date of any information about the misstatement and Method 
2, which combines all relevant dates for the misstatement (see Appendix 1). Abnormal returns are computed either using a one-factor event study model or a simple 
market adjustment as described in Section 3. p-values are from two-tailed t-tests. The interaction terms, indicated by the variable names followed by an “_INT” represent 
misstatement characteristics multiplied by the stealth indicator, which takes the value of unity if the misstatement disclosure was only in the Half-year or Financial-year 
report without separate disclosure and zero otherwise. Regressions are estimated with clustered standard errors by firm and year as per Gow et al. (2010). CARs are 
winsorized at their 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. Variable definitions are shown in Appendices 3 and 4. 
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TABLE 8 – Results from Logistic Regressions for Predicting 
Announcement of Misstatement News on the Same Date as Earnings 
(NEWS_SAME_EARN=1), with and without STEALTH interactions 
   
 No interactions Including stealth 
interactions 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
NEGNI_EFFECT_BIG 1.437 0.001 0.950 0.139 
NEGNI_EFFECT_BIG × STEALTH   1.734 0.152 
NEGNI_EFFECT_SMALL 0.354 0.329 0.701 0.331 
NEGNI_EFFECT_SMALL × STEALTH   -0.479 0.559 
POSNI_EFFECT 0.581 0.105 1.220 0.090 
POSNI_EFFECT × STEALTH   -0.849 0.292 
REV 1.035 0.014 1.143 0.036 
REV × STEALTH   -0.378 0.648 
COREEXPENSES 0.762 0.019 0.749 0.172 
COREEXPENSES × STEALTH   0.056 0.935 
FRAUD -2.403 0.001 -1.352  0.039 
NUMERRORS -0.016 0.904 0.062 0.721 
MISSTATEMENTLAG 0.311 0.010 0.168 0.155 
STEALTH 3.511 0.001 3.570  0.001 
SIZE 0.111 0.088 0.112 0.092 
LEV 0.084 0.646 0.045 0.812 
ROA -0.150 0.333 -0.187 0.236 
BIG4 0.120 0.664 0.121 0.662 
AGE -0.280 0.046 -0.298 0.035 
Constant -3.771 0.002 -3.771 0.003 
   
Nagelkerke R2 0.502 0.509 
Wald Chi sq 171.278 164.591 
N 703 703 
Logistic regression results for predicting misstatement news released on the earnings announcement date. The two-
tailed p-values are shown. Coefficients and p-values less than 0.001 are shown as 0.001. Regressions are estimated 
with robust standard errors clustered by firm and year as in Gow et al. (2010). Variable definitions are shown in 
Appendices 3 and 4. 
 
